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Indice

I Quaderni del Dipartimento di Scienze Politiche
dell'Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore..... 5

ATTI DEL IX CONVEGNO DI STUDIO SULL'ALLEANZA ATLANTICA
LA LOTTA AL TERRORISMO TRANSAZIONALE:
UN RUOLO PER LA NATO?

Introduction 11
di MASSIMO DE LEONARDIS

The Historical Role of NATO 15
di MASSIMO DE LEONARDIS

Europe, Transnational Terrorism and Hybrid War 27
di MARCO LOMBARDI

The Reasons of a No Victory and the Future Perspectives.
The New Phase of the Afghan War
and the Role of the Islamic State (IS/Daesh)..... 39
di CLAUDIO BERTOLOTTI

Il “Syraq” tra “Stato Islamico” e frammentazione..... 49
di ANDREA PLEBANI

La NATO e la Federazione Russa,
dalla crisi ucraina alla lotta contro Daesh 67
di EUGENIO DI RIENZO

International Relations Theory and
NATO's Post-Cold War Path: an Ongoing Debate 85
di LUCA RATTI

La NATO e le partnership: un “serbatoio di coalizioni”? 111
di GIANLUCA PASTORI

Il ruolo della NATO nella lotta al terrorismo secondo gli Stati Uniti	129
di DAVIDE BORSANI	
From Flank Defence to War Against Terrorism. Germany's Posture on the NATO Periphery since the Cold War (1961-2016)	155
di BERND LEMKE	
Turkey and NATO as seen from Ankara.....	169
di STEFANO M. TORELLI	
L'Italia nel contrasto al terrorismo	175
di GIUSEPPE CUCCHI	
Uomini e mezzi per un intervento italiano	193
di PIETRO BATAACCHI	

MISCELLANEA

Società e Stato nel magistero di Pio XII	207
di BENIAMINO DI MARTINO	
La questione dei diritti umani nello spazio post-sovietico.....	251
di RUSTAM KASYANOV ed EKATERINA TORKUNOVA	
<i>Gli Autori</i>	263
<i>Dipartimento di Scienze Politiche dell'Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore. Membri di prima afferenza</i>	269

I Quaderni del Dipartimento di Scienze Politiche dell'Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore

Il Dipartimento di Scienze Politiche dell'Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore ha più di trent'anni di vita, essendo stato costituito nel 1983 sulla base del precedente Istituto di Scienze Politiche. Conta attualmente ventisei membri di prima afferenza; oltre ai Docenti e Ricercatori di ruolo ed ai Professori a contratto, svolgono la loro attività di studio e di ricerca nell'ambito del Dipartimento un numero rilevante di collaboratori a vario titolo (Assegnisti di ricerca, Borsisti post-dottorato, Dottori e Dottorandi di ricerca, Addetti alle esercitazioni, Cultori della materia).

Il Dipartimento costituisce una delle due strutture scientifiche di riferimento della Scuola di Dottorato in Istituzioni e Politiche. Inoltre il Centro di Ricerche sul Sistema Sud e il Mediterraneo allargato (CRiSSMA), costituito nel 1999, «collabora – in particolare – con la Facoltà di Scienze Politiche [oggi Facoltà di Scienze Politiche e Sociali] e con il Dipartimento di Scienze Politiche».

Gli afferenti al Dipartimento appartengono a diverse aree scientifico-disciplinari – diritto, scienza politica, storia – orientate allo studio dei fenomeni politici, nelle loro espressioni istituzionali e organizzative, a livello internazionale ed interno agli Stati. Il fondatore del nostro Ateneo, Padre Agostino Gemelli, affermava nel 1942 che diritto, storia e politica costituiscono «un tripode» sul quale si fondano le Facoltà di Scienze Politiche, delle quali difendeva l'identità e la funzione. Circa vent'anni dopo, Francesco Vito, successore del fondatore nel Rettorato e in precedenza Preside della Facoltà di Scienze Politiche affermava: «Noi rimaniamo fedeli alla tradizione scientifica secondo la quale l'indagine del fenomeno politico non può essere esaurita senza residui da una sola disciplina scientifica. Concorrono alla comprensione della politica gli studi storici, quelli filosofici, quelli giuridici, quelli socio-economici». Per Gianfranco Miglio, la storia è il laboratorio privilegiato della ricerca politologica.

I Docenti e i Ricercatori del Dipartimento di Scienze Politiche dell'Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore sono quindi tutti profondamente radicati nelle loro rispettive discipline, ma ritengono che il loro rigore metodologico, la loro specifica competenza, la loro capacità di comprendere i fenomeni oggetto dei loro studi siano arricchiti dal confronto interdisciplinare consentito dalla struttura scientifica alla quale appartengono. Vi sarà modo di verificare e approfondire anche in questi *Quaderni* il valore scientifico irrinunciabile del Dipartimento di Scienze Politiche.

Come immagine caratterizzante dell'identità del Dipartimento, le cui aree scientifiche hanno tutte una forte dimensione internazionale, è stata scelta la mappa disegnata nel 1507 dal cartografo tedesco Martin Waldseemüller (1470-1521), di grande importanza storica essendo la prima nella quale il Nuovo Continente scoperto da Cristoforo Colombo è denominato "America". Nel 2005 tale mappa è stata dichiarata dall'UNESCO "Memoria del mondo".

La frase «*Orbem prudenter investigare et veraciter agnoscere*», che esprime lo spirito di libera ricerca nella fedeltà alla vocazione cattolica, utilizza alcune espressioni della seguente preghiera di S. Tommaso d'Aquino: «*Concede mihi, misericors Deus, quae tibi placita sunt, ardentem concupiscere, prudenter investigare, veraciter agnoscere, et perfecte adimplere ad laudem et gloriam nominis tui. Amen*». Tale preghiera, «*dicenda ante studium vel lectionem*», a sua volta forma la prima parte di una più lunga orazione «*Ad vitam sapienter instituendam*».

Il Dipartimento di Scienze Politiche promuove:

- il coordinamento fra Docenti e Ricercatori per un efficace svolgimento della ricerca negli ambiti disciplinari di competenza;
- lo sviluppo della ricerca scientifica in ambito storico, politico, giuridico-internazionale e un attivo dialogo tra gli studiosi delle varie discipline;
- l'organizzazione di convegni, seminari e conferenze, attraverso i quali realizzare un proficuo confronto fra studiosi, l'avanzamento e la diffusione delle conoscenze nel campo delle scienze politiche;
- la realizzazione di pubblicazioni scientifiche, che raccolgano i risultati delle ricerche promosse e i contributi dei membri del Dipartimento e degli studiosi partecipanti alle attività seminariali e di ricerca organizzate dal Dipartimento stesso.

Proprio la rilevante e qualificata attività promossa dal Dipartimento ha indotto alla pubblicazione (a stampa e su Internet) dei presenti *Quaderni*, per ospitare atti e testi derivanti dalle iniziative promosse dal Dipartimento, nonché saggi e articoli dei suoi Docenti e Ricercatori, dei loro collaboratori a tutti i livelli e di autori esterni.

Da questo numero entrano in vigore alcune modifiche nell'organizzazione scientifica e redazionale dei *Quaderni*, rese necessarie dal loro crescente sviluppo. La pubblicazione degli articoli già da questo numero è soggetta a *Peer Review* anonima. Viene creato un Comitato di redazione il cui segretario sarà il Dr. Davide Borsani. Il Direttore ringrazia per il suo impegno il Prof. Gianluca Pastori, che ricopriva l'incarico di Capo redattore, ora abolito.

Il presente numero pubblica nella prima parte le relazioni pervenute e pubblicabili presentate al IX Convegno di studio sull'Alleanza Atlantica: *La lotta al terrorismo transnazionale: un ruolo per la NATO?* Nella sezione *Miscellanea* compaiono due articoli su aspetti del pensiero cristiano, cattolico e ortodosso, in campo politico.

Il prossimo Quaderno n. 12 verrà pubblicato nel corso del 2017.

From Flank Defence to War Against Terrorism. Germany's Posture on the NATO Periphery since the Cold War (1961-2016)

di BERND LEMKE

Abstract—*Il saggio descrive la posizione tedesca riguardo i temi di difesa e terrorismo e si basa su un'ampia indagine storica sulla NATO, dato che il funzionamento dell'Alleanza è tuttora affidato ai principi enunciati durante la Guerra Fredda nonostante i molti e decisivi cambiamenti strategici, militari e politici dal 1990 a oggi. Durante la Guerra Fredda, la Germania era, seppur limitatamente, preparata a difendere i fianchi dell'Alleanza, soprattutto in termini militari, dato che il punto fondamentale era quello della difesa da possibili attacchi provenienti dal Patto di Varsavia, lungo l'Elba. In termini politici e soprattutto economici, il sostegno proveniente da Bonn, specialmente per il fianco Sud, era maggiore, ma presentava anche chiari limiti. La stessa situazione si presenta oggi. Certamente vi sono stati importanti cambiamenti dal 1990, fra cui il più importante è stata la missione della Bundeswehr in Afghanistan. Tuttavia, la Germania non è ancora preparata ad impegnarsi oltre certe ben precise restrizioni. Nel frattempo, e magari la missione in Afghanistan rappresenterà un'eccezione storica, l'azione politica, militare e strategica della NATO è tornata a concentrarsi sugli stessi confini che aveva durante la Guerra Fredda. Per quanto riguarda la guerra al terrorismo, che non rientra fra le principali competenze della NATO, la Germania, come gli altri membri, farà tutto il necessario per garantire la sicurezza nazionale, tuttavia missioni militari estese sono da escludersi con ogni probabilità.*

The threat of transnational terrorism can take many shapes. Hence, the fight against this threat is equally many-faceted, not only due to the complex structures of terrorist networks, but also because the structures of the Western states and their alliances are very complex. Therefore, there are various different aspects and facets.

Counter-terrorism can be divided into three basic fields of action¹.

¹ For the following, see K. Hirschmann – C. Leggemann (eds.), *Der Kampf gegen den Terrorismus, Strategien und Handlungserfordernisse in Deutschland*, Berlin 2003, especially section, Reaktionsstrategien und institutioneller Handlungsbedarf, Dirk Nabers, *Allianz gegen den Terror; Deutschland, Japan und die USA*, Wiesbaden, 2005;

First: the domestic dimension, i.e. the work of state security bodies and intelligence services. In this context, fight against terrorism is inseparably linked to the fight against international organised crime.

Second: outward action on a national scale, i.e. using national resources, including the military, against terrorist networks. This may happen in cooperation with other nations, but not necessarily so.

Third: measures taken against the terrorists that are conducted by or integrated in alliances such as NATO. This applies mainly to those instruments of the alliance that are provided by all partners together, here especially the entire range of measures of NATO crisis management, including diplomatic initiatives, blockades, economic sanctions against areas and states that support terrorism, show-of-force operations etc., and ultimately the application of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. An outstanding feature here are rapid reaction forces, such as NATO Response Force and the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF)². These military units can be deployed for demonstrative purposes within crisis management as well as for combat missions including the fight against terrorism in the broadest sense.

These three fields are, of course, interconnected and overlapping in many aspects, so that they cannot always be treated separately. The following remarks will concentrate on the third of these fields, i.e. the German position and contribution within the alliance, in particular at the military level³. To this end, I will first outline the

J. Urban, *Die Bekämpfung des Internationalen Islamistischen Terrorismus*, Wiesbaden 2006, ch. II, V, VI, J. Thiele, *Auslandseinsätze der Bundeswehr zur Bekämpfung des internationalen Terrorismus, Völker- und verfassungsrechtliche Aspekte*, Frankfurt/M., 2011.

² See B. Lemke, *Die Allied Mobile Force 1961-2002*, Munich, 2015; B. Lemke, *Crisis Management in Turkey and the Problem of Escalation: The Allied Mobile Force from 1961-2003 and the Future of NATO's South-Eastern Flank*, "Atlantic Voices", vol. 3 (2013), n. 9; B. Lemke, *Strategische Mobilität im Kalten Krieg 1956 bis 1990: Die Allied Mobile Force, die UK Mobile Force und die Rapid Defence Joint Task Force im Vergleich*, in H. Möllers – R.J. Schlaffer (eds.), *Sonderfall Bundeswehr? Streitkräfte in nationalen Perspektiven und im internationalen Vergleich*, Munich 2014, pp. 229-260.

³ This article concentrates exclusively on NATO, Crisis Management and Terrorism. It not possible to deal with subjects like nation-building, comprehensive approach or counterinsurgency (COIN) as, e.g., executed in Afghanistan, and the historical debates on this topic (colonial warfare). For a general overview see B. Lemke, *Historical foundations of Counterinsurgency as a Western "strategy" for Afghanistan*, in B. Chiari (ed.), *From Venus to Mars? Provincial Reconstruction Teams and the European Military Experience in Afghanistan 2001-2014*, Freiburg, 2014, pp. 103-122.

position of Germany during the Cold War, as this is essential for the understanding of the period after 1990.

The major terrorist threat today originates from the fringes of NATO allied territory, no matter where bombings and attacks happen in the last instance. The fight against Islamist terrorism is one of the greatest, if not the greatest, challenge that NATO and the West as a whole have to face today. It is embedded in the discussion concerning the Muslim world in general, although Islamist terrorism and Islam must by no means be put on the same level.

Now, the edges of NATO territory are endangered areas since the foundation of the alliance in 1949. Some commentators distinguish between "periphery" and "semi-periphery"⁴. "Periphery" is used for the countries that form the flanks of NATO territory, i.e. direct member states of NATO, whereas the term "semi-periphery" describes countries which border immediately on NATO territory, but are no NATO members. This applies primarily to Georgia and Ukraine, but maybe also to the Autonomous Region of Kurdistan and Iraq, for instance. Turkey is a special case, as it has on one hand been a NATO member since 1951. But, with its population being mainly Muslims, it is on the other hand closely linked to the Islamic world which is today increasingly threatened by destabilisation. This situation is by no means now. There were a lot of troubled times for Turkey before

⁴ This distinction goes back to the World Systems Theory of Immanuel Wallerstein where it covered mainly economic aspects. The adaption for security issues can be very well discussed and is at least a general measure stick for the strategic situation of NATO today. See JRL 9301, *Interview with Georgi Derluguian*, 13.10.2005, by K. Harris (20.11.2005), <http://www.russialist.org/archives/9301-19.php>, and for the full text: <http://www.nodoctors.com/derluguian.html>. For this distinction under practical auspices see A. Meaher, *The Baltics: A contact zone on the periphery, 1990-2013*, in B. Lemke (ed.), *Periphery or Contact Zone? The NATO flanks 1961 to 2013*, Freiburg, 2015, pp. 135-140; F. Zilio, *The Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe and NATO southern flank: Mediterranean security as a source of intra-bloc tension*, in B. Lemke, *Periphery or Contact Zone? ...*, cit., pp. 71-73 and G. La Nave, *the transformations of the defense of the post-colonial Mediterranean and the role of Italy, 1963-1972*, in B. Lemke, *Periphery or Contact Zone? ...*, cit., pp. 99-106. See also M.S. Blinnikow, *A Geography of Russia and its Neighbors*, New York 2011. Further R. Craig Nation, *Russian, the United States and the Caucasus, in US Government, Department of Defence, US Army, Strategic Studies Institute, Russia, the United States, and the Caucasus; The Security Concerns of the Baltic States as NATO Allies*, Washington, DC, 2007 [Kindle edition], pos. 19-625 and J.S. Corum, *The Security Concerns of the Baltic States as NATO Allies*, Carlisle, PA, 2013.

1990, including internal upheaval that triggered military coups in 1960, 1971, 1980 and 1997.

The areas which are geographically in the forefront in the fight against terrorism today i.e. the flank regions of NATO territory, also before 1990 belonged to the critical areas of the alliance. This not least because the alliance had always limited military and political assets in these regions. Today they are again first-class trouble-spots.

The situation since 1990 changed a lot, of course⁵. The enormous, and fundamental problem that had shaped the political climate before, the bipolar conflict, has largely vanished. But basic aspects and features have stayed the same, in particular concerning the position of Germany.

Stabilising the flanks has been a delicate matter since the beginnings of the alliance and especially since the late sixties. They were outlying, underdefended and for many NATO-partners not in the central focus.

West Germany, on its part, concentrated on defending its own territory, i.e. on conducting the forward defence along the Elbe River⁶. This is not surprising, since the largest threat was looming there. Both German states were embedded into large tank armies, heavily armed and equipped with nuclear weapons, which were a daunting reflection of the entire East-West conflict. National defence and allied defence for Bonn came directly together and concentrated in the home country. This is why the West German government in Bonn was not really enthusiastic when demands were voiced within NATO that the flanks of the alliance should be reinforced, too. Despite this, West Germany agreed that all partners had to be protected if NATO was to fulfil its purpose. The decisive principle was: security is indivisible⁷.

⁵ For the new situation after 1990 and the changing tasks and challenges for NATO in the new millennium see Y. Alexander – R. Prosen (eds.), *NATO – from Regional to Global Security Provider*, Lanham, 2015, E. Hallams – L. Ratti – B. Zyla, *NATO beyond 9/11, The Transformation of the Atlantic Alliance*, London-New York, 2013, J. Medcalf, *Going Global or Going No-where? NATO's Role in Contemporary International Security*, Oxford, 2008, J. Varwick, *Die NATO, Vom Verteidigungsbündnis zur Weltpolizei?*, Munich, 2008.

⁶ B. Thoß, *NATO-Strategie und nationale Verteidigungsplanung, Planung und Aufbau der Bundeswehr unter den Bedingungen einer massiven atomaren Vergeltungsstrategie 1952 bis 1960*, Munich, 2006, Part II, ch. 1 and 2.

⁷ The methodical and empirical core of the following remarks on the topic is primarily based on the results of a research program at the *Bundeswehr* Center of

Consequently, West Germany had no choice but to take part in the strengthening of NATO flanks. However, it kept its contribution within clear boundaries. In military terms, deploying major formations, such as divisions, to the flanks was absolutely no option. The maximum contribution was two battalions and two squadrons of fighter-bombers for the mobile response force of NATO, the Allied Mobile Force (AMF), which was the historical forerunner of the NATO Response Force and the VJTF, the most important rapid reaction force of NATO today. This meant one battalion and one squadron for each flank. This was the only substantial military contribution Germany was willing to make.

The option of deploying NATO troops *outside* NATO territory, one of the major tasks after 1990 until today was out of question for Bonn. This issue, in fact, was discussed by the WEU and NATO as early as in the mid-1960s. When the crisis concerning Cyprus erupted, NATO developed plans for a multinational peace keeping force for the island up to 8000 troops including 1200 German soldiers. Cyprus was (and is) no member of NATO but very close and was a major conflict area between the two main pillars of the South Eastern Flank Greece and Turkey, so Germany agreed to participate. The project, nevertheless, was shelved because France, in heavy opposition to Washington, blocked every arrangement⁸. Then, in 1965, Italian General Raffaele Cadorna proposed on a conference of the West European Union to establish a global NATO task force. The West German government in Bonn vehemently refused. The reaction was the same when the United States reassessed their priorities after the hostage crisis in Tehran in 1979, and decided to step up their presence

Military History and Social Sciences in Potsdam. It includes the following volumes: B. Lemke (ed.), *Periphery or Contact Zone? The NATO Flanks 1961-2013*, Freiburg, 2015, H. van Nes, *Die Geschichte von Live Oak als historisches Beispiel für modernes Krisenmanagement* (transl. *The history of Live Oak as Historical Example for modern crisis management*), 1958-89, publication due in 2016/17, B. Lemke, *Die Allied Mobile Force 1961-2002*, Munich, 2015, S. Brenner, *Die NATO und der griechisch-türkische Konflikt* (transl. *NATO and the Greek-Turkish Conflict, Diss.*), publication due in 2016/17. All volumes contain major research within a multi-archival, multi-perspective and multi-dimensional framework and present a vast array of sources from American, British, German and NATO archives.

⁸ For this aspect see also S.M. Brenner, NATO and the second Greco-Turkish conflict over Cyprus (1964/65): Its consequences for political cohesion of the North Atlantic Alliance, in B. Lemke (ed.), *Periphery or Contact Zone? ...*, cit., pp. 59-60.

in the Persian Gulf as well as to establish a major projection force, the Rapid Defence Joint Task Force (RDJTF). This formation comprised several élite divisions and a number of fighter-bomber wings. As a consequence, the United States had to reduce their contribution to the reinforcements and reserves for the core defences of NATO in Central Europe. This decision sparked fierce arguments in which also Germany was involved.

In economic matters, the Germans took a somewhat different stance. West Germany agreed to provide financial and economic support to Greece and Turkey when they got into trouble. The measures included financial assistance, arms supply, and trade benefits. When the Americans were increasingly struggling with economic difficulties due to the Vietnam War, West Germany in part took their role as the sponsor of the southern flank⁹.

At the political level, West Germany was involved in the Euro-Arab dialogue within the context of European Political Cooperation (EPC)

⁹ H. Möller et al. (eds.), *Akten der Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1979*, Munich, 2010, vol. I, Doc. 5, Vermerk über das Gespräch der vier Staats- und Regierungschefs in Guadeloupe am 6. Januar 1979, 6.1.79, p. 29. See further, *ibid.*, Doc. 2 – 4; I.D. Pautsch (ed.), *Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1978*, Munich, 2009, vol. I, Doc. 146, Vermerk betreffend Gespräch des Bundeskanzlers mit dem türkischen Ministerpräsidenten Ecevit am 10.5.78, pp. 712f. and Doc. 147, same matter, 11.5.78, p. 718. For the background see *ibid.*, Doc. 26, p. 162, with FN 31 and 32. See further *ibid.*, vol. II, Doc. 356, Aufzeichnung des MDir Blech vom 23.11.78 über die Initiierung eines multilateralen Hilfspaketes für die Türkei, pp. 1736 – 1740; Möller et al. (eds.), *Akten der Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1979*, cit., vol. I, Doc. 86, Vermerk über das Gespräch des Bundeskanzlers mit dem amerikanischen Deputy Secretary of State, Warren Christopher am 20.3.78, pp. 381 – 384. Detailed background information on the German leading role within the European context in: H. Möller et al. (eds.), *Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1980*, Munich, 2011, vol. I, Doc. 22 Aufzeichnung des Ministerialdirigenten Dröge und des Ministerialdirektors Fischer, Betr.: Türkeihilfe, pp. 128 – 144. Dazu auch J. Brown, *Delicately Poised Allies: Greece and Turkey, Problems, Policy Choices and Mediterranean Security*, London, 1991, pp. 5 and 55. Bonn assistance finally was established as constant factor in the Western planning for help. See *Senate Delegation Report, Perspectives on NATO's Southern Flank*, April 3 – 13, 1980, A Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations US Senate, June 1980, Washington, DC, 1980, p. 16, Möller et al. (eds.), *Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1980*, cit., vol. I, Gespräch des Bundeskanzlers mit König Khalid am 17.6.80, p. 917, further *ibid.*, Doc. 145, Botschafter Pauls, Brüssel (NATO), an das Auswärtige Amt, Bericht über die Sitzung des Verteidigungsplanungsausschusses (DPC) am 14. Mai 1980 unter Teilnahme der Außenminister, 14.5.80, FN 5.

and launched diplomatic initiatives to stabilise the Mediterranean and the Middle East in particular. The Americans, however, made very clear to the Germans and the Europeans that they regarded the Middle East and the Gulf region as their sphere of interest, and blocked most of the European initiatives.

To sum it up: from a German point of view supporting the flanks of NATO in the Cold War was necessary to keep up the Alliance as a whole. The principle of "security is indivisible" had to be upheld, otherwise the very existence of NATO would have been called into question. Therefore, the West German government, at least in military terms, made the minimal contribution that was considered necessary to reach this important goal.

In general, this attitude again structures the German perspective today, despite all the changes in strategy and politics that have occurred since 1990. The developments since then at times certainly tended to a fundamental makeshift, but now, in the year 2016, the situation comes back to the old paradigms.

On the whole, of course, a major new aspect came up after 1990, the involvement of the German *Bundeswehr* in operations outside NATO territory¹⁰. The question is if this new point really changed old ways.

The political turnaround in 1990 brought considerable strategic changes in its wake. The threat from the East was fading. But that, despite the hopes of many people did not mean times had suddenly

¹⁰ For the history of the growing German involvement in global missions in the transatlantic framework see S. Rynning, *NATO in Afghanistan: The Liberal Disconnect*, Stanford, 2012; N. Hynek – P. Marton, *Statebuilding in Afghanistan: Multinational Contributions to Reconstruction*, London-New York, 2012, H.J. Gießmann – A. Wagner, *Armee im Einsatz: Grundlagen, Strategien und Ergebnisse einer Beteiligung der Bundeswehr*, Baden-Baden, 2009, in particular the articles by Theiler, Erhart/Kaestner, Zürcher and Freuding. See also E. Sangar, *Historical Experience. Burden or Bonus in Today's Wars? The British Army and the Bundeswehr in Afghanistan*, Freiburg i.Br. 2014. H. Kriemann, *Germany's participation in the NATO intervention in the Kosovo conflict in 1998 and 1999: Germany on its way to becoming an European formative power?*, in B. Lemke (ed.), *Periphery or Contact Zone? The NATO flanks 1961 to 2013*, Freiburg, pp. 141-160; K. Brummer – S. Fröhlich, *Zehn Jahre Deutschland in Afghanistan*, Sonderheft der Zeitschrift für Außen und Sicherheitspolitik, 3 (2011). The research on the *Bundeswehr* in the 21st century has only begun. The Center for Military History and Social Sciences has, therefore, set up a Department for Global Mission where ground basic research on this topic in the international and global framework will be conducted.

become peaceful. Human history and human action don't work that way. There are no peaceful comfort zones that go unaffected by the constant struggles for power. So, soon, big trouble arose in the Balkans, a civil war that claimed many lives, involved genocidal violence and put the stability of Europe as a whole in jeopardy. Reunified Germany and its partners were called on to intervene. But the Germans were faced with major difficulties, not least because the Balkan states and peoples had not forgotten the dark legacy the German *Wehrmacht* and *SS* had left in the years before 1945. Moreover, considerable domestic resistance, problems with international law, and ethical reservations came up. It took Germany years to cope with the situation and find its own constructive role. For Operation "Allied Force" during the Kosovo War 1999, the bombing campaign against the Yugoslavian army, a *modus vivendi* was finally found that provided the basis for all operations to follow¹¹.

Meanwhile, terrorism began to move to the top of the agenda. The 9/11 terrorist attacks and the "War on Terror" they ensued culminated into two new wars, whose main goal had become to fight terrorism. For Germany, the two wars constitute the decisive dividing line today¹².

Seen from a military history perspective, the German involvement in the Afghanistan War is a significant break with the past. So far, the mission in Afghanistan has been the first large-scale operation of German troops since the Second World War, by far larger than the Balkan mission, and it is likely to be the only one for the next few years to come.

From the first day on, the purpose of this mission had been to fight terrorism. Then Minister of Defence Struck declared: «German security will be defended at the Hindu Kush». This was a very clear statement justifying this extensive approach of counterterrorism, which by far exceeded the "usual" methods, such as domestic counter-intelligence and defence measures, network-centric security measures in Europe itself, cyber defence, non-proliferation agreements for nuclear arms, and all the more defensive instruments.

¹¹ For this important aspect see H. Kriemann, *op. cit.*, pp. 141-160.

¹² For the following see K. Brummer, *Die Innenpolitik der Außenpolitik, die Große Koalition*, "Governmental Politics" und Auslandseinsätze der Bundeswehr, Wiesbaden, 2013, especially ch. 1.

Immediately the question came up if this mission marked a decisive change of direction towards extensive and permanent global involvement. The answer clearly is: no. Only shortly after the beginning of the mission in Afghanistan did the German government refuse to take part in the second big Western project, the large-scale military operation in Iraq, much to the annoyance of the Americans¹³. This decision was made not only because of the questionable propaganda of the United States against Saddam Hussein's Weapons of Mass Destruction, which in fact did not exist. Neither was it only due to the particular problems in Iraq or the domestic policy of the government under German Federal Chancellor Schröder. Any involvement in both Afghanistan AND Iraq would have gone far beyond the line that Germany had drawn for itself. Moreover, the mission in Afghanistan was openly defended politically as collective defence of the alliance, whereas the war in Iraq was soon perceived as a (late) imperialistic adventure of Britain and the United States and was therefore fiercely debated. To put it differently: the mission in Afghanistan was the utmost of major global campaigns what the Germans would actively conduct.

Then, in the last ten years, by and by, Germany and maybe even NATO as a whole seem to have returned to a geo-strategic situation that is somewhat similar to the one during the Cold War. The threats came now closer and closer to NATO's own borders.

If we now take a look at the geographical positions of NATO's centres of defence, we will find that, from a German point of view, the situation is comparable to the Cold War. The flanks of NATO territory are threatened again, though not by an opposing military alliance, but by civil war, collapsing states in the "semi-periphery" and Islamist terrorist organisations.

And more important, under these conditions, one of the major threats from the Cold War still looms. In the Cold War, NATO strategists did not so much worry about a major nuclear attack on the flanks. In fact, they were afraid of minor provocation, incursions or local hostile actions, e.g. the occupation of a few square miles by the Iraqi or Syrian army. What to do then? NATO as an alliance would have been

¹³ For this aspect and its far reaching problems seen from the perspective of leading historians and political scientists see the H. König – M. Sicking, *Der Irak-Krieg und die Zukunft Europas*, Bielefeld 2004, especially the articles by E.-O. Czempiel and J. Kocka.

under major psychological pressure not to lose credibility. The same principle is valid today. The provocations of the IS, the unstable situation within Turkey, the terrorist attacks in Europe – they all undermine the credibility of NATO and the West. And that is the major goal of IS.

This kind of scenario will be more or less the standard pattern for the future, at least what the military aspects are concerned. As far as it can be foreseen, there will be no deployment of large military bodies or large-scale operations for the German armed forces in the nearer future. Just like during the Cold War, Germany will, if needed, eventually deploy small on-site formations, sometimes just as a symbolic gesture.

The only thing that could possibly change the German policy would be if the current strategy, i.e. the involvement of the US Air Force (USAF) and, on the ground, of Kurdish *peshmerga* troops and other allies was going to prove insufficient to destroy the Islamic State (Daesh). If this would lead to more instability, more bombing in Europe, first bombings in Germany – then Berlin would have to rethink its strategy and, maybe, actively engage in direct attack against IS. But this option seems unlikely.

Apart from that and seen more globally, clear boundaries also have been set. Even though the German army is involved in numerous missions, particularly in Africa (e.g. Mali, Operation Atalanta)¹⁴, and continues its commitment in Afghanistan, it now mostly plays a supportive role in the fight against terrorism. Among other things, it provides equipment and know-how, trains the local forces and supports local structures and, first and foremost, provides a symbolic show of presence. The training mission of the *Bundeswehr* for the *peshmerga* in and around Arbil is one of the most important examples for this new perspective.

One “new” major aspect reinforces all that in a significant way. Germany is turning back to, if you want, its own approaches, i.e. Eastern Europe, where new threat potential has emerged that is by now considered as big a threat as terrorism. The events following Russian

¹⁴ The Center for Military History and Social Sciences has set up a broad series of Historical Guides for every German mission (“Wegweiser zur Geschichte”), which can be downloaded at: <http://www.mgfa-potsdam.de/html/einsatzunterstuetzung/>. For a general overview: B. Chiari – M. Pahl (ed.), *Auslandseinsätze der Bundeswehr*, Paderborn, 2010. In 2016 a volume on Iraq and Syria will be published: B. Lemke (ed.), *Wegweiser zur Geschichte Irak und Syrien*, Paderborn, 2016 (upcoming).

intervention in Georgia in 2008, the war in Ukraine and in particular the occupation of the Crimea have drawn German attention back to continental Europe.

Thus, Germany's strategic situation comes nearer and back to the conditions as they were during the Cold War, even though under different conditions and although it is clear that history does not repeat itself: the threats from the East get more and more attention, although their sources today lie far east of the Elbe River, while the involvement in the periphery of NATO territory and beyond is continued, but has been reduced significantly.

In this respect, the large-scale mission in Afghanistan on the whole was and is an exception, maybe even just an intermezzo. This is partly due to practical experience. Large-scale military missions, particularly in the Orient, are fiercely debated in domestic politics and have so far been rather unsuccessful, as can be seen in Iraq in particular. In addition to that, the religious, social and political situation in countries such as Syria and Iraq is more than complicated and highly dangerous. Last, but not least, stabilising the territory of one's own alliance directly, and the area just near one's front door, has the first priority over missions far away.

The Americans are not particularly pleased with the possibility of Germany retreating from the global dimension. But returning its focus on its old-and-new core interests and regions suits another basic target of the US the expectation that the Europeans stabilise and look after their own country to relieve and back them for their global tasks. However, meanwhile Washington has acknowledged that the threat in Eastern Europe has increased. This can also be seen by new US-troop deployments to be executed soon.

To what degree do all these different problems and perspectives condition the fight against terrorism and to what degree is this fight a task for NATO in general terms?

The fight against Islamist terrorism is indeed a new kind of threat that has not yet existed during the Cold War. But it is not the first experience we had with terrorism. Germany and Italy in particular have experienced terrorism before, although it has been more a "homemade" problem, as the *Red Army Faction* and the *Brigate Rosse* show. Apparently, NATO had already been involved in these matters,

as researchers have found out in the meantime. But this is not the right place to discuss operations such as “*Gladio*”¹⁵.

On a general level, I would dare to maintain that Islamic terror is much more dangerous than the “old” left terrorism. This i.a. has to do with the fact that the overall situation has become much more unclear and volatile since the end of the bipolar balance between East and West. Terror in particular is a characteristic phenomenon of this new situation, as its major strength lies in the great ability to act flexibly, out-of-state and across borders on a large scale, without any rigid structures. Another one is multipolarity, as represented by the increasing involvement of the Americans in the Pacific region.

On the other hand, are significant strengths and continuities. The Western world, and especially the members of NATO, are still a multilateral organisation with clear structures, clear limitations, and clear borders, in spite of the fact that this is exactly what the global acting terrorists are trying to undermine. In this respect, the fact that the attacks of Brussels and Paris have revealed deficits in our networks not only indicates that there are problems that must be addressed, but also that the national political structures are still in place and stable. Maybe it is even better to keep them in place instead of frantically tearing down all administrative borders and abandoning internal structures. Finding a solution within the EU, with orderly proceedings and general consent, is the only possible way.

And there is progress in further development of the manifold means of counterterrorism, including domestic defence measures, exchange of data, cooperation of intelligence services, cyber defence, the fight against organised crime, measures aimed at the social and economic stabilisation of the countries in the Orient and Africa, etc. The terrorist attacks in Brussels have shown that the European countries are already cooperating in many ways in this field, although there are still deficits.

The basic question, however, is whether this really falls within the core tasks of NATO, a subject that can very well be discussed¹⁶.

¹⁵ It is not possible to discuss in the course of this article the quality of books like D. Ganser, *NATO's secret armies, Operation Gladio and terrorism in Western Europe*, London, 2005 or E. Schmidt-Eenboom – U. Stoll, *Die Partisanen der NATO, Stay-Behind-Organisationen in Deutschland 1946-1991*, Berlin, 2015.

¹⁶ For this bunch of aspects and the respective discussions see J.W. Peterson, *NATO and Terrorism, Organizational Expansion and Mission Transformation*, New

Despite all guidances and declarations from and after 2010 and 2012, there is at least a long way to go. One of the biggest problems is the question what stays on paper and what becomes reality. Everyone who knows the long history of NATO long term armament projects (e.g. the MC 70 and Long Term Defence Plan, LTDP of the seventies) also knows the story of paper schemes that remained good hope and good intention, never really got over that phase¹⁷.

Military defence, foreign politics and diplomacy, in contrast, definitely are among the original fields of competence of NATO. They have already been core tasks of NATO since the Cold War days, and Germany will continue its commitment in these fields. One essential goal will be successful crisis management, i.e. fending off aggressors without risking a major war while maintaining the stability and integrity of the alliance. This, too, clearly is a consistency with the Cold War era.

It must, however, be doubted whether the success story of the West until 1989 can simply be repeated in general. Some German commentators and politicians seem to hope that the German *ostpolitik* and the policy of *détente* from Cold War days could be repeated, that it just needed to be modernised in order to provide stabilisation and shape the world according to Western interests¹⁸. That is largely unrealistic, because our adversaries today are completely different, much more aggressive and destructive. The Islamic State (Daesh) can by no means be put on one level with the countries of the Eastern bloc before 1990. Such organisations must be fought with counterterrorism measures until they are crushed. They will never fall apart of their own accord. In the East of Europe, the situation is different. Putin,

York, 2011, A.A. Michta – P.S. Hilde (eds.), *The Future of NATO, Regional Defense and Global Security*, Ann Arbor, 2014, Liselotte Odgaard (ed.), *Strategy in NATO, Preparing for an Imperfect World*, London-New York, 2014. A. Behnke, *NATO's Security Discourse after the Cold War, Representing the West*, London-New York, 2013, especially ch. 9 and 10.

¹⁷ One the major papers to be discussed in this respect is: Allied Command Transformation, *Multiple futures Project, Navigating towards 2030*, Final Report, April 2009, available at: <http://www.act.nato.int/nato-multiple-futures-project-documents>.

¹⁸ One example: *Deutscher Vorsitz in der OSZE, Neue alte Ostpolitik*, "Der Tagesspiegel", 12.1.2016. See also J. Mischke – A. Umland, *Germany's New Ostpolitik, An Old Foreign Policy Doctrine Gets a Makeover*, "Foreign Affairs", 09.04.2014, available at: <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/western-europe/2014-04-09/germanys-new-ostpolitik>.

in contrast to al-Baghdadi, is a person you can talk with. At the same time, the Russians take a different stance than the Eastern European reform states in the 1980s. This situation can only be resolved by means of crisis management, strength, integration, and, if need be, the deployment of rapid response forces. Germany will make a contribution to this, probably in the meanwhile traditional manner.

To conclude with a short summery concerning the German position in the fight against terrorism, we have to expect:

In “military terms”: involvement to the extent that is deemed necessary, but with clear limitations and focused on assistance, symbolic presence, and NATO crisis management. Large-scale missions will be joined only in extreme emergencies, after thorough examination, and with great reluctance.

In “political terms”: the focus clearly is on diplomatic negotiations, combined with the constant endeavour to peacefully stabilise the situation, particularly at and beyond the flanks of NATO territory. This is an aspect the German government itself considers to be one of its core competences.

In “economic terms”: reconstruction aid to stabilise threatened states and communities, and backing up alliance partners in the periphery. However, clear domestic political limits have been set after the EU and Euro crises. The old picture of Germany as the “paymaster of Europe” has since then come to have a strong negative connotation, and it is often expanded by the image of a “miser of Europe” who manipulates its European partner states in obvious and debatable ways.

At the same time, Germany will never support collective measures of any kind whose dimensions are such that they would jeopardise its own economic and social stability or that of its partner states. This, too, clearly is a consistency with the Cold War era. The question of whether the Americans will be willing and able to close the growing gap between the military requirements and deficits of the European states is a sensitive issue that could be a breaking point within NATO.

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