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I Quaderni del Dipartimento di Scienze Politiche dell'Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore

Il Dipartimento di Scienze Politiche dell'Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore ha più di trent'anni di vita, essendo stato costituito nel 1983 sulla base del precedente Istituto di Scienze Politiche. Conta attualmente ventisei membri di prima afferenza; oltre ai Docenti e Ricercatori di ruolo ed ai Professori a contratto, svolgono la loro attività di studio e di ricerca nell'ambito del Dipartimento un numero rilevante di collaboratori a vario titolo (Assegnisti di ricerca, Borsisti post-dottorato, Dottori e Dottorandi di ricerca, Addetti alle esercitazioni, Cultori della materia).

Il Dipartimento costituisce una delle due strutture scientifiche di riferimento della Scuola di Dottorato in Istituzioni e Politiche. Inoltre il Centro di Ricerche sul Sistema Sud e il Mediterraneo allargato (CRiSSMA), costituito nel 1999, «collabora – in particolare – con la Facoltà di Scienze Politiche [oggi Facoltà di Scienze Politiche e Sociali] e con il Dipartimento di Scienze Politiche».

Gli afferenti al Dipartimento appartengono a diverse aree scientifico-disciplinari – diritto, scienza politica, storia – orientate allo studio dei fenomeni politici, nelle loro espressioni istituzionali e organizzative, a livello internazionale ed interno agli Stati. Il fondatore del nostro Ateneo, Padre Agostino Gemelli, affermava nel 1942 che diritto, storia e politica costituiscono «un tripode» sul quale si fondano le Facoltà di Scienze Politiche, delle quali difendeva l'identità e la funzione. Circa vent'anni dopo, Francesco Vito, successore del fondatore nel Rettorato e in precedenza Preside della Facoltà di Scienze Politiche affermava: «Noi rimaniamo fedeli alla tradizione scientifica secondo la quale l'indagine del fenomeno politico non può essere esaurita senza residui da una sola disciplina scientifica. Concorrono alla comprensione della politica gli studi storici, quelli filosofici, quelli giuridici, quelli socio-economici». Per Gianfranco Miglio, la storia è il laboratorio privilegiato della ricerca politologica.

I Docenti e i Ricercatori del Dipartimento di Scienze Politiche dell'Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore sono quindi tutti profondamente radicati nelle loro rispettive discipline, ma ritengono che il loro rigore metodologico, la loro specifica competenza, la loro capacità di comprendere i fenomeni oggetto dei loro studi siano arricchiti dal confronto interdisciplinare consentito dalla struttura scientifica alla quale appartengono. Vi sarà modo di verificare e approfondire anche in questi *Quaderni* il valore scientifico irrinunciabile del Dipartimento di Scienze Politiche.

Come immagine caratterizzante dell'identità del Dipartimento, le cui aree scientifiche hanno tutte una forte dimensione internazionale, è stata scelta la mappa disegnata nel 1507 dal cartografo tedesco Martin Waldseemüller (1470-1521), di grande importanza storica essendo la prima nella quale il Nuovo Continente scoperto da Cristoforo Colombo è denominato "America". Nel 2005 tale mappa è stata dichiarata dall'UNESCO "Memoria del mondo".

La frase «*Orbem prudenter investigare et veraciter agnoscere*», che esprime lo spirito di libera ricerca nella fedeltà alla vocazione cattolica, utilizza alcune espressioni della seguente preghiera di S. Tommaso d'Aquino: «*Concede mihi, misericors Deus, quae tibi placita sunt, ardentem concupiscere, prudenter investigare, veraciter agnoscere, et perfecte adimplere ad laudem et gloriam nominis tui. Amen*». Tale preghiera, «*dicenda ante studium vel lectionem*», a sua volta forma la prima parte di una più lunga orazione «*Ad vitam sapienter instituendam*».

Il Dipartimento di Scienze Politiche promuove:

- il coordinamento fra Docenti e Ricercatori per un efficace svolgimento della ricerca negli ambiti disciplinari di competenza;
- lo sviluppo della ricerca scientifica in ambito storico, politico, giuridico-internazionale e un attivo dialogo tra gli studiosi delle varie discipline;
- l'organizzazione di convegni, seminari e conferenze, attraverso i quali realizzare un proficuo confronto fra studiosi, l'avanzamento e la diffusione delle conoscenze nel campo delle scienze politiche;
- la realizzazione di pubblicazioni scientifiche, che raccolgano i risultati delle ricerche promosse e i contributi dei membri del Dipartimento e degli studiosi partecipanti alle attività seminariali e di ricerca organizzate dal Dipartimento stesso.

Proprio la rilevante e qualificata attività promossa dal Dipartimento ha indotto alla pubblicazione (a stampa e su Internet) dei presenti *Quaderni*, per ospitare atti e testi derivanti dalle iniziative promosse dal Dipartimento, nonché saggi e articoli dei suoi Docenti e Ricercatori, dei loro collaboratori a tutti i livelli e di autori esterni.

Da questo numero entrano in vigore alcune modifiche nell'organizzazione scientifica e redazionale dei *Quaderni*, rese necessarie dal loro crescente sviluppo. La pubblicazione degli articoli già da questo numero è soggetta a *Peer Review* anonima. Viene creato un Comitato di redazione il cui segretario sarà il Dr. Davide Borsani. Il Direttore ringrazia per il suo impegno il Prof. Gianluca Pastori, che ricopriva l'incarico di Capo redattore, ora abolito.

Il presente numero pubblica nella prima parte le relazioni pervenute e pubblicabili presentate al IX Convegno di studio sull'Alleanza Atlantica: *La lotta al terrorismo transnazionale: un ruolo per la NATO?* Nella sezione *Miscellanea* compaiono due articoli su aspetti del pensiero cristiano, cattolico e ortodosso, in campo politico.

Il prossimo Quaderno n. 12 verrà pubblicato nel corso del 2017.

The Historical Role of NATO

di MASSIMO DE LEONARDIS

***Abstract** – Fino a pochi anni fa, il compito principale della NATO era lo schieramento “fuori area”. In Europa, l’Alleanza rimaneva “vigilant and prepared”, ma nessuno pensava realmente che ci sarebbe stato bisogno di un intervento. Tuttavia, alla vigilia dello scoppio della crisi in Ucraina, c’erano stati segni che facevano pensare che quella fase stesse giungendo a conclusione. Fra questi, si ricordi il ritiro degli Stati Uniti dall’Iraq e, soprattutto, dall’Afghanistan, dove la NATO stava chiudendo la più importante missione della sua storia. L’emergere della minaccia transnazionale dello Stato Islamico (Dā’ish) non cambiava lo stato delle cose. Allo stesso tempo, il deteriorarsi delle relazioni con la Russia ha portato l’Alleanza all’approvazione del nuovo Readiness Action Plan, a rafforzare il suo schieramento militare lungo il confine orientale e ad istituire una Very High Readiness Joint Task Force di quattromila uomini. Stiamo tornando alla Guerra Fredda? No, dato che il confronto attuale fra NATO e Russia non è da considerarsi alla stregua di uno scontro ideologico globale; piuttosto, la sfida posta da Putin è l’espressione del tradizionale interesse nazionale russo di preservare la propria sfera di influenza. Nel contesto strategico odierno, il rischio principale è dunque che la NATO dedichi troppe risorse alla risposta alla minaccia russa, a spese di altri scenari, a cominciare da quello mediorientale. Una NATO vigile in Europa è un fatto positivo, ma non è abbastanza, se essa non è pronta a fronteggiare la minaccia principale, ovunque essa emerga.*

The debate among the historians

This year, I choose to address a long term issue. There are good reasons for this, even if my subject might appear rather out of tune respecting current pressing issues. However, I am an historian and I think that, at the beginning of this conference, it is appropriate to discuss if NATO is still historically relevant. I do not discuss the fact that NATO is still useful, certainly the most effective among international organizations and alliances. But is NATO a key player in current affairs, an expression of a rather solid community of purpose as it was during the Cold War? Are the threats NATO pretends to face really relevant?

The question of NATO adaptation to a new phase of international relations is not new, since it was widely discussed exactly sixty years

ago by the Committee of the “three wise man”, the Italian Gaetano Martino, the Canadian Lester Pearson and the Norwegian Halvard Lange. The Committee was formed after years of discussions on the necessity of creating something more than a simple military alliance, of building a real “Atlantic community”. As I will briefly explain later, the project of an “Atlantic community” remained a dead letter, and in 1978 the Italian Manlio Brosio, who had been NATO Secretary General between 1964 and 1971, remarked that «for a long period the perception of the danger and the necessity of common defence were quite sufficient to prop up the Alliance»¹.

This issue of the “Atlantic community” drew also the attention of historians. In September 1955, in Rome, the X International Congress of Historical Sciences dedicated a session to *Le problème de l'Atlantique du XVIII au XX siècle*, with the participation of prominent historians. The introductory report was prepared by Jacques Godechot and Richard Palmer, who both studied the age of “Atlantic revolutions”, which shook Europe and the Americas between the 1770s and the 1820s. Discussing that report, the distinguished British historian Sir Charles Webster maintained that «the regionalisation of the world had been a theme for discussion since modern historiography began, but the Atlantic was not suggested as a “region” until the Second World War» and added that «the Atlantic Community might be a temporary phenomenon. It was created by the policy of the USSR and if this changed it might change also»².

Indeed, the Soviet Union has not only changed but disappeared. Paraphrasing Dean Acheson's well-known remark on Britain³, we might say that the Atlantic Alliance “has lost an enemy and not yet found a role”. The efforts to revive the Russian threat look to me as the lifting of an old lady in search for a new youth.

¹ M. Brosio, *Introduzione to AA.VV., Trent'anni di Alleanza Atlantica*, Roma, 1979, p. VII.

² *Atti del X Congresso Internazionale: Roma 4-11 settembre 1955*, Roma, 1957, p. 571. The introductory paper was: J. Godechot – R.R. Palmer, *Le problème de l'Atlantique du XVIIIème au XXème siècle*, in *Relazioni: riassunti delle comunicazioni. Atti a cura della Giunta Centrale per gli Studi Storici e Comitato internazionale di Scienze Storiche*, vol. V, Storia contemporanea, Sansoni, Firenze, 1955, pp. 173-239.

³ In a speech at West Point military academy on 5th December 1962, the former Secretary of State said: «Great Britain has lost an Empire and has not yet found a role». (In *Vital Speeches*, January 1st, 1963, p. 163).

Another British historian, the Marxist Eric Hobsbawm, agreed with Sir Charles «that this idea [of the “Atlantic community”] has been brought into historical analysis as a result of the political situation since 1945, which might be a very temporary situation». A few years later, this vision was contested by the Italian liberal historian Vittorio De Caprariis, who wrote about «a new civilization» which, in Modern age, «was born indeed on the Atlantic», and on «a coherent development of the European and American history». NATO was «not only the result of a specific contingent situation, it was also the finishing line of an historical process at the same time manifold and univocal»⁴.

The United States towards Europe: a challenge or a resource?

In the perspective of diplomatic history⁵, I tend to agree with Webster’s and Hobsbawm’s opinions. In the system of international relations the birth of the independent United States of America marked a major break, which became evident more than one century later, but was immediately perceived at the moment by expert observers. Many Founding fathers, from George Washington to James Madison and Alexander Hamilton, envisaged an “imperial” destiny for the young republic⁶. In 1816, Thomas Jefferson, third President of the United States, wrote to his predecessor John Adams that «old Europe will have to lean on our shoulders, and to hobble along to our side, under the monkish trammels of priests and Kings, as she can. What a colossus shall we be»⁷. Actually in 1794 the Spanish minister in Paris had made this comment on the United States: «This federal republic was born as

⁴ V. De Caprariis, *Storia di un'alleanza. Genesi e significato del Patto Atlantico*, Roma, 1958, pp. 18-19, 129. At the end of the XIX century, British historian John Robert Seeley had described the formation of an Atlantic civilization as the key factor of modern history (*The Expansion of England. Two Courses of Lectures*, London – New York, 1895²).

⁵ De Caprariis writes that «maybe the professional deformation of the scholar of diplomatic virtuosities of the last century had veiled the clarity of the English historians’ judgment» (*op. cit.*, p. 11).

⁶ Cfr. N. Ferguson, *Colossus. The Price of America’s Empire*, New York, 2004, pp. 1, 38; R. Kagan, *Dangerous Nation: America’s Place in the World from Its Earliest Days to the Dawn of the Twentieth Century*, New York, 2006, chapter 1.

⁷ Quoted in N. Boyle, 2014. *How to Survive the Next World Crisis*, London – New York, 2012, p. 65.

a pygmy, but a day will come that it will be a giant, even a colossus»⁸. In 1817, the American minister in London and future President John Quincy Adams (son of the above-mentioned John) wrote that «the universal feeling of Europe in witnessing the gigantic growth of our population and power is that we shall, if united, become a very dangerous member of the society of nations»⁹.

On the issue of the birth of independent States in Latin America, British Foreign minister George Canning tried to call «the New World into existence, to redress the balance of the Old»¹⁰, but Washington didn't follow London's lead and reaffirmed its unilateralism with the Monroe doctrine, the third pillar of which rejected the *raison d'état* and the European tradition, indicating the republic as the institutional regime most adapted to the American continent. Commenting that doctrine, Prince Metternich rightly observed that the United States «had declared [...] their intention not only to oppose power to power, but also, to speak with greater exactitude, altar to altar»¹¹.

From 1815 to 1914, the United States completed the conquest of the West, survived a civil war, and, at the turn of the century, appeared as a new protagonist in the international arena. The United Kingdom had to come to terms with the new situation hoping to control it, but, as the Scottish historian Donald Cameron Watt puts it¹², the ground was prepared for Uncle Sam replacing John Bull as “imperial power”.

With the First World War, Europe committed a “suicide”, as remarked already in 1916 by Pope Benedict XV¹³. The United States at least aggravated this suicide. In 1917, they were prominent in killing the idea of a compromise peace and in 1918 inaugurated the

⁸ Cit. in Kagan, *op. cit.*, p. 4.

⁹ Cit. *ibi* in exergue to chapter 5.

¹⁰ Speech of 12th December 1826 at the House of Commons, *Hansard*, XVI (N.S.), 390-98.

¹¹ D. Perkins, *Storia della dottrina di Monroe*, Bologna, 1960, p. 30; on this subject see Kagan, *op. cit.*, chapter 6.

¹² D.C. Watt, *Succeeding John Bull: America in Britain's Place, 1900-1975*, Cambridge, 1984.

¹³ The Pope described the Great War as «the suicide of civilized Europe» in three subsequent occasions, including his famous Apostolic exhortation *Dès les début* of 1st August 1917, published in French and Italian in *Acta Apostolicae Sedis, Commentarium Officiale*, a. IX, vol. IX, part I, Roma, 1917, pp. 417-20, 421-23. The complete Italian text is also published in *Insegnamenti pontifici*, ed. by Monaci di Solesmes, vol. V, *La pace internazionale*, part I, *La guerra moderna*, Roma, 1958, pp. 131-35.

policy that recently has been labelled as “regime change”, when they refused to negotiate an armistice with Germany unless the Imperial government was replaced by a republic. The Germans complied, but the Weimar republic got no reward for going fully democratic and dragon’s teeth were sown, while Washington plunged into neo-isolationism, or better an “America first” position. The Wall Street crash in 1929 had serious consequences around the world, in particular revived the fortunes of Hitler’s Nazi party.

After the Second World War, the United Kingdom fully realized that a new American Empire was born. In 1944, Harold Macmillan uttered his famous quip: «We [...] are Greeks in this American empire. You will find the Americans much as the Greeks found the Romans – great big, vulgar, bustling people, more vigorous than we are and also more idle, with more unspoiled virtues but also more corrupt. We must run AFHQ [Allied Forces Headquarters] as the Greek slaves ran the operations of the Emperor Claudius»¹⁴. There is little doubt that the birth of the Atlantic Alliance owed a lot to the Anglo-American “special relationship” and, more in general, was the product of an Anglo-American-Canadian inner group with a cultural and political background almost exclusively WASP (White Anglo-Saxon Protestant)¹⁵. Still in recent years, maybe «we are faced with a third Anglo-American West strictly Atlantic which is in the middle or over the other two»¹⁶.

The historical studies on the origins of the Atlantic Pact clearly demonstrate that few people in Europe considered the link with Washington something more than a necessity, unpleasant to many, imposed by the political and military confrontation with the Soviet Union. For the Italian statesman Alcide De Gasperi, it was a

¹⁴ A. Sampson, *Macmillan: A Study in Ambiguity*, London, 1967, p. 61.

¹⁵ E. Reid, *Time of Fear and Hope. The Making of the North Atlantic Treaty 1947-1949*, Toronto, 1977, pp. 11, 62-69. On the importance of the Anglo-American “special relationship” as premise and foundation of the Atlantic Alliance there is a very large literature; for a synthesis and bibliographic suggestions cfr. R. Ovendale, *Anglo-American Relations in the Twentieth Century*, London, 1998 and Id., *La NATO e la «relazione speciale» fra Gran Bretagna e Stati Uniti*, in M. de Leonardis (ed.), *La nuova NATO: i membri, le strutture, i compiti*, Bologna, 2001, pp. 63-88. For a long term cultural history, see De Caprariis, *op. cit.*, chapter I, *Gli incunaboli dell’atlantismo*.

¹⁶ O. Barié, *Dalla Guerra Fredda alla grande crisi. Il nuovo mondo delle relazioni internazionali*, Bologna, 2013, p. 219.

«marriage of convenience»¹⁷. Already in the early Fifties, the French government feared that the Alliance with the United States might become a kind of Cominform and later General De Gaulle described American President Lyndon Johnson as «the greatest threat to world peace today», an opinion shared by one third of the French¹⁸. In the aftermath of the Suez crisis, the German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, albeit a staunch supporter of Atlanticism, expressed his solidarity to the French President of the Council of ministers Guy Mollet with these words: «In this moment, the European countries must unite. It is not a problem of supra nationality. But we must unite against America [...]. The United States is so badly acquainted with the situation in Europe and with European politics that we have to cry»¹⁹. Even the British often expressed, in private, their irritation towards their cousins beyond the Atlantic²⁰. In the Suez crisis, the Americans

¹⁷ M. Del Pero, *Gli Stati Uniti e De Gasperi (1945-1953)*, in *Quaderni Degasperiani per la storia dell'Italia contemporanea*, ed. by P.L. Ballini, vol. III, Roma, 2011, p. 47. De Gasperi did not share the thesis of the «big American boys» that the attack in Korea could be a general rehearsal of a similar aggression in Europe (*ibi*, p. 43). A stinging remark of the same type was made years later by the Italian President of the Council of ministers Amintore Fanfani to NATO Secretary General Dirk Stikker: «Christopher Columbus discovered America but could not bring to the New Continent the wisdom and the experience of the Europeans ... the United States put into NATO strenght, the Europeans experience» (*Colloqui a Roma con Stikker*, 9.10.1961, Archivio Fanfani, Senato della Repubblica, Roma [AF], Sez. 1, Serie 1, Busta 14, Fasc. 17). Similar opinions may be found in the British Foreign Office's documents at the beginning of 1948 [see M. de Leonardis, *I «tre cerchi»: il Regno Unito e la ricerca della sicurezza tra Commonwealth, Europa e «relazione speciale» con gli Stati Uniti (1948-1949)*, in O. Barié [ed.], *L'alleanza occidentale. Nascita e sviluppi di un sistema di sicurezza collettivo*, Bologna, 1988, pp. 29-30]. Later Britons pointed their cards on the «special relationship» with Washington, but stinging judgments of British statesmen towards the United States are not lacking.

¹⁸ M. Kahler, *US politics and transatlantic relations: we are all Europeans now*, in D.M. Andrews (ed.), *The Atlantic Alliance Under Stress. US-European Relations After Iraq*, Cambridge, 2005, pp. 81-101.

¹⁹ *Adenauer to Mollet, Compte-rendu d'un entretien*, 6.11.1956, in Documents diplomatiques français (DDF), *Série après 1954*, vol. VIII, tome II, 1^{er} juillet-23 octobre 1956, Paris, 1989, n. 138, pp. 231-38.

²⁰ For example Harold Macmillan, in his diary, once labelled as «stupid» a speech of the American Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara (H. Macmillan, *At the End of the Day 1961-1963*, London, 1973, p. 123) and on a previous occasion lamented with strong words the treatment the British received from the Americans («a mixture of patronising pity and contempt») and gave a very critical description of the latter's character (*The Macmillan Diaries, The Cabinet Years, 1950-1957*, London, 2003, pp.

humiliated their two major European Allies, but soon inherited their problems and their imperial responsibilities.

In 1973 American Secretary of State Henry Kissinger «remarked that he was beginning to draw melancholy conclusions about the cohesiveness of the [Atlantic] alliance. It never cohered on anything except the one thing least likely to arise: a military attack on Western Europe»²¹.

The debate on art. 2 in the 1950s

The Preamble and art. 2 of the Atlantic Treaty of 1949 expressed the intention of building something more than a mere military alliance. As a matter of fact, art. 2 was never put into practice, not even after the end of the Cold War, when there has been much talk about the political role of NATO in respect to its military role; on the contrary, the Atlantic has become “larger”²².

I will now briefly recall the failed efforts in the Fifties of the XX century to develop an “Atlantic community”. In September 1951, the Atlantic Council in Ottawa, with the participation of Foreign, Defence and Economy ministers of the member States, deliberated the formation of a five members²³ ministerial Committee for this purpose. On 30th October, one of the Committee’s working groups presented a report of 51 pages²⁴. The issues considered were the «co-ordination;

187-88, diary of 27th September 1952). As Winston Churchill, Macmillan had an American mother.

²¹ *Cromer to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office*, 25.10.1973, *Ceasefires in ME War*, National Archives – London, FCO 93/295, E 371. NFW 10/16 part A (Rowland, III Earl Cromer, was Her Majesty’s Ambassador to Washington and a grandson of the famous colonial proconsul).

²² Also on this topic there is a very large historical and political literature, for which I refer to the bibliographies in M. de Leonardis, *Europa-Stati Uniti: un Atlantico più largo?*, Milano, 2001 and Id., *Alla ricerca della rotta transatlantica. Le relazioni tra Europa e Stati Uniti dopo l’11 settembre 2001 durante la presidenza di George W. Bush*, Milano, 2016.

²³ With representatives of Belgium, Canada, Italy (the minister of the Treasury Giuseppe Pella), the Netherlands and Norway. The topic of this paragraph is examined at length in M. de Leonardis, *L’atlantismo italiano da Alcide De Gasperi a Gaetano Martino: l’art. 2 del Patto atlantico*, in *Quaderni Degasperiani*, to be published, pp. 181-207.

²⁴ http://archives.nato.int/uploads/r/null/2/5/2581/AC_10-D_1_ENG.pdf. On 16th November was circulated an updated version: <http://archives.nato.int/uploads/r/>

and frequent consultation on foreign policy, having particular regard to steps designed to promote peace», a «closer economic, financial and social co-operation; designed: to promote conditions of economic stability and well-being, both during and after the present period of the defence effort, within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or through other Agencies», the «collaboration in the fields of Culture and Public Information». However, it was remarked that some members of the working group «were very dubious» whether some of these topics «ever would or should become matters of active consideration within NATO», but this did not prevent listing a long series of recommendations²⁵. Certainly, it was a “list of wishes”, which found a modest realization, as for example the formation on 18th June 1954 of the Atlantic Treaty Association and in 1955 of the North-Atlantic Parliamentary Assembly, moreover two bodies formally independent from NATO.

The first détente seemed to provide the great occasion for activating art. 2. In December 1955, the Atlantic Council in Paris recognized that «recent developments in the international situation made it more necessary than ever to have closer co-operation between the members of the Alliance as envisaged in Article 2 of the Treaty»²⁶. The Committee of the “three wise men” was charged to present a report on «non-military co-operation in NATO». During its works, two crises, the Soviet invasion of Hungary and the Anglo-French military expedition in Egypt (concocted with Israel), attenuated the hopes of détente, stressed the permanent necessity of keeping a high military readiness and marked a very serious break between the United States and their two major European allies.

The Report²⁷ noted that «inter-Allied relations have also undergone severe strains. [...] An Alliance in which the members ignore each other's interests or engage in political or economic conflict, or harbour

null/2/5/2593/AC_10-D_2_ENG.pdf

²⁵ Attachment n° 1 of the document was a list («in no way exhaustive») of 26 international organizations (including the Universal Postal Union!) and 13 other non-governmental bodies at world or regional level the tasks of which were of interest for NATO.

²⁶ C-M (55) 128, http://archives.nato.int/uploads/r/null/2/5/25149/C-M_55_128_ENG.pdf.

²⁷ http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_17481.htm?selectedLocale=en.

suspicions of each other, cannot be effective either for deterrence or defence. Recent experience makes this clearer than ever before».

Creating «a sense of Atlantic Community» had not been «the decisive, or even the main impulse in the creation of NATO. Nevertheless, it gave birth to the hope that NATO would grow beyond and above the emergency which brought it into being». This hope had found expression in the preamble and in articles 2 and 4 of the Treaty, which contained «at least the promise of the grand design of an Atlantic Community [...] because of this insistent feeling that NATO must become more than a military alliance [...]. There is the even more far-reaching question: “Can a loose association of sovereign states hold together at all without the common binding force of fear?” [...] Strengthening the political and economic side of NATO is an essential complement to – not a substitute for – continuous cooperation in defence». On the “out of area” issue, the Report remarked that «NATO should not forget that the influence and interests of its members are not confined to the area covered by the Treaty, and that common interests of the Atlantic Community can be seriously affected by developments outside the Treaty area».

At the Atlantic Council in Paris of December 1956²⁸, discussing the report the Canadian minister of Foreign affairs Lester Pearson admitted that perhaps the States with greater responsibilities «must get a little tired of hearing those of us who represent States without so much power and responsibility talking so much about consultation». The British Foreign Secretary John Selwyn Brooke Lloyd recalled London’s worldwide responsibilities and declared his agreement to consultation if it was aimed to share the burden and not simply to express criticism and give way to obstructionism. This approach was strongly endorsed by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles who stated that, in the light of United States’ global commitments, the coordination of all the aspects of foreign policy was impossible, also because sometimes it was necessary to act before consulting. Therefore, he shared the Report’s and agreed to approve it in general terms, but its concrete application had to be verified on a case by case basis.

The result of the Atlantic Council was a list of good intentions, but in practice little was realized; during the entire Cold War, NATO

²⁸ The access to the minutes of the various sessions of the Atlantic Council is at <http://archives.nato.int/verbatim-record-of-meeting-final-25;isad>.

continued to remain what had been since its origins, a military alliance with a precise *casus foederis* and a well-delimited geographical outreach. After all, the “three wise men” themselves had remarked: «It has not been difficult to make these recommendations. It will be far more difficult for the member governments to carry them into effect».

Conclusion: increasingly diverging perspectives

I come to my conclusions. I believe that the period of the Cold War was a parenthesis between two epochs in which the approach of the European countries and of the United States to international politics has been quite different, since their culture and historical experience are different. I would also say that the Cold War was a period with unprecedented characteristics in the field of international relations, which no longer exist. During the Cold War, inside the West, intended as Europe and the United States, disputes, even bitter ones, did not lack, but were downplayed or shelved since there was an agreement on the identification of the common enemy and on the means to face it. However, even during the Cold War it was impossible to create a real “Atlantic community” and of course today it’s almost completely unrealistic with an Alliance which includes 28, soon 29, and not 15 members.

There is no sign on the horizon that NATO might become a global alliance for freedom and for the Western values and interests as advocated ten years ago by former Spanish Prime Minister José María Aznar and by a good number of Americans, which was the only strategic idea advanced for the future of the Alliance. As I said at the beginning, NATO is still the most effective among international organizations and alliances: «the question for the foreseeable future may not be whether the alliance will persist, but whether or not it will be of increasing or diminishing value to the participants»²⁹.

In any case, there is no hope that, to use the expression of De Caprariis, NATO might be «the political brain of the West»³⁰. Indeed, while at the origins of the Alliance British Labour Foreign minister Ernest Bevin talked of creating «a sort of spiritual federation of

²⁹ S. Sloan, *Permanent Alliance? NATO and the Transatlantic Bargain from Truman to Obama*, London – New York, 2010, p. 287.

³⁰ De Caprariis, *op. cit.*, p. 167.

the west»³¹, nowadays the West is losing ground and does no longer appear as united as during the Cold War.

NATO appears quite focused on its core task, the defence of the territory of the member States ex art. 5 and Russia is again perceived as the major threat³², at least by a number of countries which have understandable reasons for thinking so. This view is contested by other countries and German Foreign minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier in June 2016 spoke out against recent NATO military exercises in Poland and the Baltics, describing them as «sabre-rattling»: «the one thing we shouldn't do now is inflame the situation with loud sabre-rattling and warmongering [...]. Anyone who thinks a symbolic tank parade on the alliance's eastern border will bring security is wrong [...]. We would be well advised not to provide a pretext to renew an old confrontation»³³. The process of enlargement shows NATO's bulimia and, after having been a factor of stabilization, now risks to provoke destabilization, pushing the Alliance's posture very close to St. Petersburg.

NATO has failed to recognize that Islamic fundamentalism has replaced Communism as the major threat; it's unlikely that the summit in Warsaw, in Poland, will change this situation, given also that we have as a formal ally Turkey, which is progressively returning to her Islamic traditions.

In any case, NATO has to wait for the new American President. Mrs Clinton is more safe and experimented, but lacks any vision and I would repeat for her the famous slogan against Nixon: «would you buy a used car from this woman?». Her record as Secretary of State is not smart at all. She followed a contradictory policy on the “Arab Springs” and was a convinced supporter of the disastrous intervention in Libya. Her election would continue Obama's policy: keep a foot in Europe agitating the spectre of the Russian threat.

³¹ See M. de Leonardis, *I «tre cerchi»...*, cit., pp. 28-29.

³² An interesting news is that Anders Fogh Rasmussen, Denmark's Prime Minister from 2001 al 2009 and NATO Secretary General from 2009 to 2014, has gladly accepted the post of Adviser to Ukraine's President Petro Poroshenko and his first statement was in favour of strengthened sanctions against Moscow.

³³ <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/06/18/german-foreign-minister-ac-cuses-nato-of-warmongering-against-rus/>.

Mr Trump has expressed an “America First” position, declared that NATO is «obsolete»³⁴, and warned that the United States will no longer foot the largest part of NATO’s bill (a position shared also by Obama). He does not antagonize Russian President Vladimir Putin³⁵ and supports protectionism. His election is a shock for the European Union, if in January 2017 there will still be one.

³⁴ «NATO is something that at the time was excellent. Today, it has to be changed. It has to be changed to include terror. It has to be changed from the standpoint of cost because the United States bears far too much of the cost of NATO» (http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/27/us/politics/donald-trump-interview-highlights.html?_r=0).

³⁵ In his interview, appeared both on the *Sunday Times* and on the *Corriere della Sera* on 19th June 2016, Trump advocates an agreement with Russia, which would have benefic effects over the entire world.

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