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L’Italia e la pace del 1919
Abstract – Since November 11th 1918, the Armistice Day, the hope of French people was profound. Paris, because of the Peace Conference, was the centre of the democratic and free world and the people hoped to get a real and endless peace. But France was subjected to important human, economic, moral crises and numerous fears, which transformed the President of the Council George Clemenceau, alone empowered to negotiate at the Peace Conference, in providential venerated and intransigent hero. This intransigence has taken three forms: the League of Nations based on the collective security and the international arbitrage; the safety of the frontier with Germany, the firmness with the others heads of State and the confrontation with Germans. But the disillusion has been profound because some people thought this treaty of Versailles too hard and others thought it was too conciliatory. In fact, the synergy of hope, intransigence and disillusion in 1919 transformed the treaty of Versailles, which had got conciliating sides, in a truce and not a peace.
Abstract – The image extrapolated from Italian parliamentary debates, after the collapse of the Tsarist Empire, configures a policy that fails to elaborate a precise interpretation of the Russian events, and that fails to develop a coherent idea towards the “provisional Government”. In Italy, the dynamics of Russian conspiracies and secret policies were ignored. Diplomacy did not know the protagonists who would soon be players of the Bolshevik revolution, their ideology, their inspiring doctrine and the psychology of the masses. In this chaotic phase, during the outbreak of the Russian civil war, Italy decides, in agreement with the Allied powers, to send numerous military contingents to the aid of the counter-revolutionary militias. While the Peace Conference opens in Versailles to restore order in Europe, in Russian territory, armies from different European countries, decide to support the “white forces”, but with negative results. The White Armies, and the Bolsheviks, disappoint the expectations of the delegations present at Versailles, and renounce the proposal for a conference on Prinkipo Island, advanced by President Wilson. The Italian military will leave Russia in the autumn of 1919, during the civil war, shortly before the defeat of the counter-revolutionary troops, strongly divided internally.
Abstract – The studies on the Italian Monarchy, although they have never disappeared from the historiographic investigation, have always concerned a small circle of authors and a very few publications. This does not mean that studies on the representatives of the House of Savoy have been lacking over the past few years; often, however, they have fluctuated either between an uncritical exaltation by pro-monarchist supporters or between open denigration by those who do not yet accept the role that the Savoy Monarchy played in the Risorgimento process and in the continuation of the unitary history. Therefore, it seemed appropriate to make a methodological choice that would put aside this kind of publicity and try to outline, and identify, a foreign policy of the sovereign during the Great War and how it dealt with the negotiations that were taking place in Paris. This essay aims to analyse the role played by Vittorio Emanuele III in the last year of war and during the Peace Conference. Retracing the sequence of events, from the proclamation of neutrality (August 1914) to the “Radiant May” in 1915, Vittorio Emanuele III appears – at the very least – to share all the most important decisions which led to the conflict: from the decision to maintain neutrality to the beginning of diplomatic negotiations and the November 19th reshuffle of the government, to the drafting of the “telegrammone” which initiated negotiations with the Allies, and the uncertainties of May to the decision to intervene. Certainly, the King always tried to look “constitutional” and to exercise his power of intervention in that grey area of relations with the political world, thus avoiding the visibility which would have exposed him; however, his ultimate power of intervention in bringing Italy to the point of war was decisive and was judged as such by foreign observers. This role of Vittorio Emanuele III continued during the war, sustaining the choice of intervention, receiving the foreign representatives and displayed a foreign policy focusing his attention to the Mediterranean area and to the Adriatic question. Role that he played also during the Peace Conference, looking to protect the Italian interests in these areas.
Abstract – This paper aims at showing the new Italian geopolitical situation imposed, after the end of the First World War, by the Treaty of Versailles with the consequent “mutilated victory”. The huge number of documents from the Archive of the Historical Office of the Marina Militare italiana describes the events that the Regia Marina had to face the day after the end of the conflict, more especially in the so called two-year period 1919-20 (“Biennio Rosso”), such as: interior structural reorganization, including staff reduction and a new program approach given by the new Navy Minister, Admiral Giovanni Sechi; demobilization of the Austro-Hungarian Navy with prohibition to annex Austrian and German booty of war units to the Regia Marina; difficult Italian political situation with the consequent birth of “fascist” movement to which some awarded Gold Medal naval officers approached, including Costanzo Ciano, Raffaele Paolucci and Luigi Rizzo.
Abstract – The centenary of the establishment of Italian-Polish relations can be analyzed and evaluated taking into account the foreign policy strategy of both countries in the last hundred years, in particular the role of Poland in italian foreign policy and Italy in polish foreign policy. Furthermore, various conditions, both external and internal, to which Italian-Polish relations were subject should be identified. Firstly they include the changing geopolitical and international situation of both countries, located in significantly distant places in Europe, subjected to slightly different influences and processes. When it comes to internal conditions, the main element was the changing system of government in both countries, often resulting from geopolitical and international conditions. Short reflections on this topics are based on the publication prepared by the author “Italy in Poland’s foreign policy. One hundred years of experience”.
Abstract – Giovanni Messe (1883-1968) was the last officer of the Italian Royal Army to be appointed in 1943 to the top rank of Marshal of Italy. He enlisted in 1901 as a cadet sergeant and fought in the Libyan war and in the Great War, being wounded twice and receiving various decorations. He emerged as an outstanding officer and a charismatic commander of the storm troops (Arditi). For four years he was one of the titular Aides-de-camp of King Vittorio Emanuele III. In the Second World War, he commanded, notably, the expeditionary corps in Russia and the 1st Army in Tunisia, where he could only delay defeat in a desperate situation. A convinced monarchist, after the armistices of September 1943, he was released by the British from imprisonment and appointed by the Royal Italian government Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces. In all roles, he performed his duties in an excellent way and no blemish tarnished his reputation. He was the Italian General who emerged from the Second World War surrounded by the highest prestige. Neither a great strategist nor a military thinker, he was a brave officer with a strong character, an inspiring leader of his soldiers, caring for their equipment, an excellent tactician and a good organizer.
Enrico Fassi, A Strange Approach. Susan Strange’s Contribution
to International Political Economy and International Relations Theory
Abstract – Esattamente 40 anni fa, con la pubblicazione dell’articolo “International Economics and International Relations: A Case of Mutual Neglect”, Susan Strange contribuiva, insieme a pochi altri pionieri, alla creazione di quella che sarebbe poi diventata nota come International Political Economy (IPE). L’articolo analizza il contributo di Strange sia in rapporto all’IPE, sia alle Relazioni Internazionali (IR), a partire dalla comprensione della “relazione genetica” tra questi due ambiti e dal ruolo svolto dalla sua produzione intellettuale nell’evoluzione di entrambi. Vengono quindi esaminati alcuni elementi fondamentali del suo “approccio eclettico”, concentrandoci in particolare sulle idee di Strange in merito alla teoria, sulla sua ridefinizione di politica e sul concetto di potere strutturale. Prima di analizzare alcuni dei problemi che sembrano aver impedito alle sue elaborazioni teoriche una diffusa accoglienza, vengono illustrati alcuni dei suoi contributi espressamente pertinenti alle Relazioni Internazionali: in particolare la sua tesi della “Ritirata dello Stato” e il suo approccio alla teoria dei regimi. In conclusione, si suggerisce come l’opera di Susan Strange, e in particolare gli aspetti qui analizzati, possano essere ancora oggi utilmente applicati, rivisitati e migliorati per esprimere finalmente tutto il potenziale del suo contributo.
Abstract – This essay analyses the Italian communist discourse on the anti-colonialist movement between the 1950s and 1960s. During those years, the Italian Communist Party (ICP) analysed this phenomenon more than other Italian party; at the same time, however, it produced a discourse strongly influenced by political bias. In fact, the ICP projected its political categories, tropes and principles – based on the deterministic Marxist(-Leninist) theory – on the colonial countries, finally denaturalising their cultural, political, and sociological specificities. Through an analysis of the main party publications (“l’Unità”, “Rinascita”, “Vie nuove”, “Nuova generazione”, and so on), this essay intends to show the modalities and consequences of this narrative path and the very eurocentric nature of communist foreign politics, which was heavily influenced by internal political motivations.
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Abstract – Il testo della conferenza presenta un panorama completo delle relazioni tra Francia e Italia a partire dal 1861. La sorella latina d’oltralpe, che vanta di essere il più antico Stato-nazione d’Europa, ha sempre avuto un atteggiamento di condiscendenza verso il ben più recente stato unitario italiano, subito emancipatosi dalla interessata tutela francese. La grande Potenza riconosciuta guardava con una certa sufficienza la nuova venuta. Fino al 1940 si alternarono momenti di forte contrasto ad altri di intesa, seppur non di vera amicizia. Nel secondo dopoguerra, lo squilibrio rimase; nonostante la perdita di un ruolo chiave negli equilibri internazionali con il Generale de Gaulle la Francia ritrovò una sua grandeur proprio mentre l’Italia cadeva nel disordine e nell’instabilità politica e iniziava la vertiginosa crescita del debito pubblico. L’attrazione culturale sincera tra le due nazioni latine non è stata sempre sufficiente per infrangere stereotipi negativi. Negli ultimi 15 anni diverse questioni hanno diviso i due Paesi: Libia, immigrazione massiccia e illegale, la politica economico-finanziaria della Unione Europea, i rapporti economici bilaterali. I partiti tradizionali sono entrati in crisi in entrambi i Paesi, ma i nuovi soggetti politici dominanti emersi sono ben diversi.
Abstract – The Briand-Kellogg Pact was an instrument to find peace in the relations between the States. It was written after the tragic experience of the First World War. The Pact strengthened the League of Nations, but the League did not have the instruments to maintain the peace between nations. It was a declamatory diplomacy. The creation of the UN was another step for a more effective institution that could promote peace. Nevertheless, even after the Second World War the violence is still present in the international relations and even the atomic era did not stop the violence around the world. Even so there are some improvements in the international relations. The challenge launched by the Briand-Kellogg Pact is still alive and it is an important prospective for the future.
Abstract – The political stabilization of the Balkan region is compromised by lasting conflicts among the different populations: the local hostilities provoked by the decline of the Ottoman Empire during the whole XIX Century have set up some permanent divisions, which were even increased by the storms of the two world wars during the XX Century. The fall of the Berlin wall, in 1989, instead of improving the situation of south eastern Europe, opened the way to further local wars which destroyed the souls of all the involved nations in the former Yugoslavian countries and in Albania. In 2019 the situation is still very complicate and the expected integration of the Western Balkan countries in the European international organizations is constantly delayed because of lack of progress in the framework of the internal reforms and in the bilateral and multilateral relations. Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, North Macedonia, Montenegro and Albania are looking forward a more fruitful mutual regional cooperation, but each country has to resolve crucial issues with the neighbor countries and with internal secession movements. The international community, since several decades, is acting in a controversial way: pretending to offer a neutral and objective assistance to the concerned Balkan countries, the international community (and especially the western countries) has too often behaved with a double face approach, showing to be quite sensitive to the potential geopolitical and economic advantages that the Balkan region may offer to any powerful foreign diplomacy newly involved in the area.
Abstract – NATO played a clear role during the so-called Cold War. The potential enemy was clear and very close for the Western European countries. This adversary was known about military capabilities and what his goals would be if a conflict broke out. As a result, the Armed Forces of the signatories of the Atlantic Pact had been organized in order to oppose this threat, in particular by developing an apparatus of “deterrence” based not only on conventional forces, but also on a massive nuclear armament. The conclusion of the opposition with the Soviet Union led to a reconsideration of NATO’s role, but the worsening of the Bosnian crisis “revitalized” the alliance and determined its first “out of area” intervention. From that moment, that actually was the first NATO’s combat engagement, were revealed the strong differences in the operational abilities between Europeans and Americans, but also became clear the different approaches to interventions, that often will “divide” the allies. The “out of area” operations are characterized not only by combat activities, but also by stabilization and reconstruction activities. This context has determined a reorganization of NATO’s military structure, in order to face the new security challenges of its members. The deterrence factor is still central to NATO’s strategy, but considering the increasingly number of “out of area” missions, the present paper will analyze the evolution of NATO’s forces, that are seeking ever greater interoperability and expeditionary capabilities.
Abstract – In the months following the fall of the Soviet Union the West was filled with a sense of hope. Indeed, it seemed that the old enemy was ready to embrace Western liberal-democratic values and the free-market economy. Although this illusion has been cultivated in the West for a long time, the invasions of Georgia and Ukraine, and the hybrid and information warfare launched by Moscow against the Transatlantic area have clearly shown that the geopolitical and historical regularities still matter in the XXI century. Therefore, it appears vital to understand the reasons why the Western approach has failed, and which are the main dynamics underlining the relations between the West and Russia in the last thirty years. At the same time, dwelling on the victory of Donald Trump in 2016 and his tenure as President of the United States, particularly with regard to US-Russia relations, it is necessary to put the present time in the right perspective, avoiding drawing hasty, and wrong, conclusions on a presidency more traditional than often painted. The aim is to create a framework to understand the past and face the future with great awareness.
Abstract – The NATO’s Southern flank represents one of the Alliance’s side on which this latter plays its future role in the Euro-Atlantic space. Until the end of the Second World War, although the operations in the former Yugoslavia (with Allied Force), in Afghanistan (with ISAF, the International Security Assistance Force), and in Libya, the NATO’s attempt to redefine its own strategic targets, in particular in front of the 2010 Strategic Concept, has faced several challenges: firstly the war in Ukraine, and then the conflict in Syria, the hybrid warfare and the international terrorism. In front of these tests, Turkey seems at the center of a pendulum between United States and Russia, on a multidimensional contest. This paper regards with a deep analysis of the principal phases of the relationships between Turkey and NATO during the last decades, starting with its accession in 1952 and finishing with the most recent 2018. The paper analyzes Ankara’s role as a bridge for Middle East and as a door throughout the Europe, from one side, and the development in Turkish foreign policy, from the other. Moreover, the analysis is focused on the so-called Sèvres Syndrome suffered by Turkey, with its particular influence on its security and defense policies.
Abstract – This study intends to examine what many scholars have defined as the «crisis of the liberal democracy model» after the rise of populist movements. By analysing both its deficiencies and structural changes promoted by these political forces, this paper evaluates democratic theory – particularly, realist school and the case study of American democracy – to debunk the assumption that voters aspire to a populist democracy. To grasp whether populism represents a real threat for democracy, this study moots a pair of critiques coming from two different standpoints. The first issue concerns «receptivity», that is, the ability of populist movements to bound their own success to political system’s ineptitude to satisfy the needs of all the citizens. On the other hand, instead, many intellectuals and traditional political forces benefit at times the interpretative tools of «political ignorance» to clarify the main reasons behind the triumph of populism. Both problems seem to be entwined, but they are not enough to explain the crisis that appears to affect the political system. The great success of populism seems to be interrelated with the concept of «identity politics», by which is much easier interpreting electoral behaviour in a democratic system based on individual social identities. Shifting focus away from policies to the decision-making process, it is possible to find a greater receptivity within populist movements. The new political fractures between centre and periphery, religion and secularism, pro-Europeans and anti-Europeans, and the public struggle on issues regarding ethnicity and race reveal the strength of «identity politics». Liberal democracy seems now to be subjected to a consolidation depending upon critical change of the functioning of the current political scenario.
Roberto Regoli e Giuliano Bianchi di Castelbianco, Il sistema politico-istituzionale e i rapporti Stato-Chiesa nella Repubblica di San Marino
Abstract – The institutional political system of San Marino relates to the systems of contemporary democratic states. Because of its long history which includes unique roles and offices (e.g. the Captains Regent), its system is configured in a completely original way. The Republic of San Marino is a secular, non-denominational State which, however, has its historical foundation in Catholicism. There are common elements in the bilateral relationship between the Holy See and the Republic of San Marino that we can find in the relationship between the Church and the larger European States. There are also unique elements, though, due to the fact that the principles of the Catholic religion are part of the historical, cultural, and social heritage of the people of San Marino. These Catholic principles have contributed in forging the identity of the people, so much so that Catholicism, in its cultural and liturgical expressions, is the junction of public life in the State. San Marino is able to recognize the value of its religious culture.
Abstract – Osservando la politica estera turca degli ultimi decenni, è possibile notare come il Paese abbia cominciato a utilizzare gli aiuti umanitari come uno strumento per affermare la propria diplomazia a livello regionale e globale. Uno sforzo che, a partire dal 2018, ha previsto per la Turchia una spesa di 7,2 miliardi di dollari americani. L’impegno da parte di Ankara vede coinvolte non solo le istituzioni pubbliche, come la TIKA (la Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency), la Turkish Red Crescent e l’AFAD (Disaster and Emergency Management Authority), ma anche le organizzazioni non governative, che si sono così viste riconoscere da parte della Turchia un ruolo importante per l’implementazione della diplomazia umanitaria. Attraverso un approccio qualitativo, questo saggio ha come focus lo studio del ruolo delle organizzazioni umanitarie internazionali nel peace building turco, con un’attenzione specifica all’IHH (Humanitarian Relief Foundation), grazie ad un’analisi delle azioni di quest’ultima sul caso siriano. Verrà inoltre analizzata la politica estera del Paese attraverso il ruolo e l’azione degli attori non statali come strumento di soft power. Il periodo analizzato nel paper è quello dell’ultimo decennio.
Abstract – The multiple crises that arose in the former Soviet space in recent years, think about Georgia and Ukraine, highlighted certain latent and still unsolved frictions between the West and Russia. This essay analyzes the root causes of these post-soviet geopolitical clashes. It shows how the current tensions with Moscow are actually a consequence of long-standing geopolitical asymmetries and historical misunderstandings that actually date back to the aftermath of the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The essay then covers the process of NATO enlargement and its new approach with Moscow and Kiev, as well as the issue known as the broken promise, relating to the historiographical controversy of NATO’s eastward expansion. All of these issues, although chronologically less current than the aforementioned crises, are key to understanding the present geopolitics in Central and Eastern Europe.
Abstract –The article aims to analyse the trend of German federal elections from 1990 to 2017. The purpose is to show which were the factors that from 1990 to 2017 have remained unchanged in the determination of the German party scenario and that have slowly produced an ideological “centrism” of the two mainstream parties: CDU/CSU and SPD. Can we talk about a political-party “continuum” from reunification until today? The German political context of a persistence of that inheritance dating back to the reunification of a centre-periphery cleavage, according to the cleavage theory of Stein Rokkan, between East Germany and West Germany, seems “a priori” to give a positive answer to this question. Last September’s federal election results would seem to be evidence of this heritage, which brought the establishment of the “Grosse Koalition” to the government and the rise of a right populist party: the AfD.
Abstract – This essay deals with the new historiographical wave around the rise and development of the American State. In particolar, it outlines the ways in which American political scientists and political historians have reconfigured the analysis of the development of the American state by challenging the traditional vulgata of the United States as a “stateless society”. In addition it offers an insight on progressive and liberal social scientists’ political and intellectual reflections, according to whom the rise of the administrative state was considered the only tool to face the increasing and pervasive role played by corporatations and so-called special interests.
Gianluca Pastori, Speak softly and carry a big stick. Politica estera e uso della forza negli Stati Uniti fra storia e attualità*
Abstract– Traditionally, force plays a central role in US foreign policy, with the willingness to wage war perceived as a key factor to define and compare the different administrations. The issue is deeply rooted in the American consciousness and dates back to the very origins of the United States as an international actor. It also reflects fundamental traits of the US political culture, like the concept of exceptionalism and the consequent vision of the United States as endowed with the “manifest destiny” to expand their territorial and political influence in both the American continent and worldwide. Since the end of the Second World War, the US new international status has made the use of force even more important, with the end of the Cold War pushing the issue to the forefront. Since the Nineties, Republican and Democratic Presidents alike have been eager to wage war to both pursue US interests and promote US values, resorting to force in an unprecedented number of occasions and with greater frequency than any other country. In this perspective, the negative experience of the Iraqi campaign (2003-11) has not been the “real” watershed that some observers believed. President Obama’s Wilsonian rhetoric has never affected his willingness to fight the Global War On Terror started by the “arch-hawk” George W. Bush, while Donald Trump’s Jacksonian promise to “make America great again” has often moved in Obama’s military footsteps. However, no real consensus has emerged on both the way in which force can act as a political and diplomatic instrument and the conditions that make this instrument useful in the American political toolbox: two sensitive and thorny issues that are deemed to trouble policymakers and the public debate for long years to come.
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Abstract: The Pontifical Committee of Historical Sciences and the Institute of Universal History of the Moscow Academy of Sciences have a 40 years old scientific collaboration. In May 2016, thanks to this cooperation, a scientific seminar has been held in the Vatican City on «The Russian Revolution in 1917 and the Churches». In this volume, a selection of contributions is published dealing with a wide range of topics, such as the problematic relationship between the Catholic Church and Russia, the ecclesiastical consequences of the 1917 Revolution in Russia, the perspective at that time of the soon-to-be Pope Pius XII, the genesis of the independent State of Czechoslovakia, the role of the Sacred Congregation of Extraordinary Ecclesiastical Affairs and the Bulgarian Orthodox Church’s reaction to the Revolution.
Abstract – In order to understand the relations between the Holy See and Revolutionary Russia, it must be considerate the previous relations between these two institutions. The Vatican had always looked to Russia as a religious rival. At the same time Czarist Russia identified itself with the Orthodox Church, imposing strong limitations to the Catholics in Russia. During the First World War the Vatican hoped in a compromise peace on the Western front, and at the same time it desired Central Powers’ strong victory on the East. When the Russian Revolution occurred, the Holy See looked it as a good opportunity for the Catholics to gain more religious freedom. From the Vatican point of view, the new Russian government could not be worse than the previous one. The anarchic situation did not allow the Holy See to understand the actual political condition in Russia, but the Vatican did not believe that the Communist party had the capacity to control the country. Even if there were some voices that suggested a stronger religious intervention in Russia, Holy See followed a cautious policy on the East. Indeed, the Vatican understood that Bolshevists were gaining the power and control over Russia. Considering the situation, Pope Benedict XV wanted to find peace in order to reorganise the Catholic ecclesiastical structures, thanks to a larger religious freedom. Only after that, there should be a major Catholic policy on the East. But the Bolshevik victory and Benedict XV’s death stopped these projects.
Abstract – The 1917 revolution had profound effects and consequences not only on the social, political, institutional dimensions of Russia, but also on the religious sphere and the ecclesiastical structure of the Russian Orthodox Church. The author focuses on this delicate and traumatic turning point of Russian history, which changed – so radically and abruptly – a hitherto Ceasaro-Papist absolutist system into a Marxist-Bolshevik atheist one. Further, the author explains how in 1917 the Russian Orthodox Church suffered the loss of its iconoclastic Constantinian legacy (historically tracing to the demise of Byzantine Empire after the fall of Constantinople to the Ottomans in 1453), of which the Russian Orthodoxy was thought to be the religious heir and successor. The Russian Tsars equally identified as the heirs to the Byzantine autocratic tradition following an historical continuum of Byzantium-Moscow-Petrograd. Proceeding from these considerations, the article focuses on the relations between the Russian Tsardom and Patriarchate, re-examining the contentious debate concerning the rehabilitatation of the Patriarchate after the events of 1917. In conclusion, the author argues that the collapse of the normative and ecclesiastical framework that constituted the Russian Tsarist imperial system also led to the collapse of a Weltanschauung, which was both typically Orthodox and Russian.
Abstract – The paper attempts to give an explanation, based on historical evidence, about the controversial and still open debate on Pope Pious XII’s “silence”. The analysis focuses on two alleged arguments regarding Pope Pacelli’s political and ideological stance: Germanophilia and anti-communist creed. The author examines if those two elements attributed to Pope Pious XII’s attitude have an actual validity or whether they have been to a certain extent inflated by some historiographical narratives. To do so, the author explores Pope Pacelli’s period as papal nuncio to Germany (1917-1927) and scrutinises his dispatches related to Russian revolutionary events in 1917.
Abstract – Against the background of the Russion revolution 1917, the article reconstructs the genesis of the Czecho-Slovak state and the struggle for its future political orientation and ideological character. It follows the political action of Tomáš G. Masaryk, a Czech politician and Socialist thinker and the future first president of Czecho-Slovakia, who came to Russia in May 1917 in the double role as a British agent with the task to face the pacifist propaganda of the Central Powers, to maintain Russia at war and to deliver information to London, and as the leader of the Czecho-Slovak exile movement who aimed at the foundation of a Czecho-Slovak state with a liberal and pro-western orientation. In this spirit Masaryk tried to influence also the Czecho-Slovak legion in Russia and to form its esprit des corps in a liberal-socialist and anti-Catholic sense, making an instrumental use of Hussitic historical imagery and of Hussitism as a metaphorical expression of Czech national resistance against Rome and Habsburg and a legitimation of its liberal and progressist ideals. This impostation, completely strange to Slovak soldiers, together with the Czech national spirit of the legion, led to national conflicts within in. Masaryk’s relation to the bolsheviks remained ambivalent: on the one hand, he denounced them as German agents, on the other hand he maintained with them practical contacts and his thoughts were deeply influenced by Marxism. Masaryk was well aware of the „political price“ of the legion that could facilitate the recognition of the future state on behalf of the Entente, at the same time however he refused its participation in the anti-Bolshevik struggle, promoting a neutrality that in the end served the bolsheviks.
Abstract – The essay focuses on how the Holy See approached the occurrence of the Russian revolutions in 1917, based on the analysis of the documentation available in the Historical Archives of a specific body which goes under the name of Congregazione degli Affari Ecclesiastici Straordinari (Congregation of the Extraordinary Ecclesiastical Affairs). The role of this institution appeared to be crucial in shaping the Vatican diplomacy during the papacy of Pope Benedict XV. The two revolutions occurred in Russia in 1917 were addressed by two distinct congregations of cardinals, the first in July of the same year and the other in June, the following. If, at a first stage, the revolution of February 1917 seemed to create better conditions for the Catholic Church in the country, ensuring a wider religious freedom, the Bolshevik revolution overturned the situation later that year. For this reason, while at the beginning the Cardinals judged the first stage of the uprisings as positive (“providential”), they changed their attitude during the 1918 meeting, which was specifically dedicated to organisational matters (such as the re-organisation of the dioceses), rather than to take a stance towards the Bolshevism. The Congregazione assumed a pragmatical attitude, its primary aim being the preservation of the position of the Church in that time of instability, and not an ideological analysis of the situation.
Abstract – The aim of the current paper is to present an attempt for conceptualization of the existing empiric collection of publications in the church press and the records of the Holy Synod of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church. Also, it aims to reconstruct certain forms of reception, perception and reflection in the Bulgarian Church discourse relating to Bolshevism and the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia. The Bulgarian Church community in the period (the early 1920s) is aware of the danger of the Bolshevism, which threatens the foundations of the Bulgarian spiritual identity and statesmanship. This threat is not looked upon in isolation but as part of a global threat to the fundamental foundations of humanity, whose traditional values are replaced by its antipodes. Through its most active clerics, the Orthodox intellectuals and the active support of the Russian emigration in Bulgaria, the Bulgarian Church explains and discloses this historical exchange trying to warn the Bulgarian society of the imminent evil by strengthening its religious consciousness.
Abstract – The articles in this volume represent the proceedings of the 10th annual Conference on international security, focusing on the history and the current affairs of the Atlantic Alliance, organized by the Department of Political Sciences of the Catholic University of the Sacred Heart of Milan. The departmental research activities have been supported throughout the years by NATO Public Diplomacy Division and other military, political and cultural institutions, such as the Atlantic Treaty Association, the International Commission of Military History and the NATO Rapid Deployment Corps-Italy. This year’s conference analyses the recent evolution of NATO policy and its critical flashpoints, mainly the tension with Putin’s resurging Russia and its many hybrid strategies – as seen in the ongoing Ukrainian conflict – and the rising threat posed to global and especially European security by radical Islamic terror. The conference aims at defining NATO’s contemporary role facing the aforementioned security risks and challenges in view of US President Trump’s foreign policy. The conference further considers the ramifications of the special meeting held at NATO’s new headquarters in Brussels on 25th May 2017, focusing on highly debated and unresolved issues such as the budgetary burden sharing and the military gap between the two sides of the Atlantic, as well as the alleged US military disengagement from Europe under Trump’s administration. Last but not least, attention is given to Italy’s geopolitical and military role in today’s NATO strategic environment and its weight with regards to what Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg considers of utmost importance, i.e. the cash, capabilities and contributions triad.
Abstract – Donald Trump is very uncertain about the NATO’s future. His remarks, albeit later corrected, show that for the United States NATO needs a new strategy, not just of defense and protection, but of offensive presence, especially in the Middle East crisis. The active presence of Russia and Iran in the region requires not only Washington greater military activity, but above all a joint effort of the Alliance in order not to deliver the Middle East to Moscow and Tehran after the ISIS’s defeat. In short, NATO needs a deep redefinition of its tasks and area of intervention. In fact, the Mediterranean sea risks to go under Russia’s control, and Iran itself takes advantage of its presence in Syria to face the Mediterranean. The United States, which has lost its hegemony on the region because of Obama’s disengagement, must again be protagonist; at the same time, NATO must wake up from its political torpor.
Abstract – The special relationship between the United States and Great Britain is historically unique. This specialty is inherent in the role played by the two countries in the evolution of the international system. Just as the architecture of the current global system is an Anglo-American legacy of the Second World War, the Atlantic Alliance emerged thanks to the US-UK special relationship. The Anglo-American relationship was also the driving force that pushed NATO to evolve during the Cold War. Relations between the US and Britain in the bipolar era saw the prevalence of American interests over British ones. London, however, chose to play the role of junior partner alongside the American superpower. If US military pre-eminence within NATO is well-known, British contributions tend to be underestimated. The special relationship played a key role in the good functioning of the Alliance also in the post-bipolar era, in particular for the transformation of NATO and in the framework of the War on Terror. The current importance on the international scene of the Anglo-American bond has declined compared to seventy years ago. The recently-proclaimed Global Britain is a regional power, at best with global interests, while Europe is no longer the heart of the American strategic interest. But the author still maintains that NATO remains the pillar of the transatlantic security, which is not divisible into a multipolar world where the concept of the West is in trouble before the assertive emergence of other actors.
Abstract – This paper will try to address the evolution of the EU-NATO relationship after the Cold War, in order to give some insight into the most pressing problems to be dealt with today to strengthen the transatlantic link. The reason is clear: the relationship has to be reconstructed avoiding approaches and policies that have been detected leading to failure and squandering money in the past decades. As far as NATO is concerned, we can also detect the underlined philosophy that has prevailed in the last decades, implicitly revised during President Obama’s Administrations and, in particular, in a more explicit way, after the nomination of President Trump. Thus, the essay analyses the origins and trajectory of the EU-NATO relationship, focusing only on selected topics, in order to understand their complex relationship, the reasons and the dynamics of change, the present situation and the lessons learned on the approaches and policies adopted in the last decades.
Abstract – The geographic dimension lies at very heart of the Atlantic Alliance. This is the reason why “out-of-area” has always been a divisive issue. At the beginning of the Cold War, the Mediterranean was the Alliance’s “soft underbelly”, a role that changed during the years, since in the Eighties the region became one of the core areas for common security. When the Soviet Union dissolved, efforts were made to develop a new Mediterranean strategy, more attentive to the emerging threats and more “projected” towards the new fronts of crisis. These efforts went side by side with the enlargement process in Eastern Europe, with the aim of shaping new forms of collaboration between the Alliance and its partners. The Mediterranean Dialogue (1994) and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (2004) were the two main tools developed to this end. However, none of them seems having been really successful. The emphasis that NATO placed on technical cooperation triggered criticisms among the Mediterranean partners, hoping for a more political engagement. At the same time, the quickly evolving strategic environment contributed in fuelling divergences among the members states as to the real threat the Alliance have to face. The increasing weight of the Eastern European partners and their fear of the new Russian assertiveness, as well as the widespread concerns about the costs of the “projected” mission, have favoured a return to the old “deterrence and defence” posture; a posture that – in the eyes of the Mediterranean members – underestimates their security needs and makes NATO more vulnerable to the many threats coming from its southern side.
Abstract – Manlio Brosio was the only Italian Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO); he was the fourth in charge, from August 1964 through September 1971, his office being one of the longest so far. During Brosio’s seven-year term, the Atlantic Alliance had to face some of the most crucial challenges since its foundation, the first being the withdrawal of the Gaullist France from the military integrated structure, in 1966. Two different processes originated from that moment of potential crisis: the reorganisation and transferral of the NATO Headquarters from Paris to Brussels, and the political rethinking of the Alliance as a whole, through the study which goes under the name of Harmel Report. Projecting the Alliance on the new international framework of improved East-West relations, the Secretary General himself was reflecting upon the key-question “Will NATO survive détente?”; indeed, in his personal diaries (all now published) Brosio revealed his own doubts, fears and sense of inadequacy for the tasks ahead. Having retraced the evolution of Brosio’s political thought and career, the essay then focuses on how he approached his difficult position, always honouring his “Atlantic conscience alongside an Italian heart”. Untiring in his work, he steered the Alliance through and out of the potential crisis, always striving to reach consensus in any decision taken during the Council meetings; his seriousness and meticulous method have been widely acknowledged. He finally managed to preserve the fundamental “political ingredient” of the Alliance and to avoid that it “maintain its shell but lose its essence”.
Abstract – This paper aims at analysing the contribution of the former Italian Foreign Minister, Gaetano Martino, to the Committee of the “Three Wise Men”, established by the North Atlantic Council in May 1956 in order to suggest the ways and means to widen and improve the cooperation among Member States in non-military sectors. The need for reflection on this issue, already dealt with by the Commission on the Atlantic Community between 1951 and 1952, was linked both with the evolution of the East-West confrontation during the years of coexistence and with the breaking point that transatlantic relations experienced during the Suez Crisis.
In this framework, the Liberal, Gaetano Martino, who led the Italian Foreign Ministry from 1954 to 1957, expressed the need to rethink the Atlantic Alliance according to the new dynamism of Italian foreign policy. He thus acted in continuity with the pro-western choice the country had made after the Second World War and with the initiatives on non-military cooperation within NATO that the previous Italian governments had carried out. The Report of the Committee of the Three Wise Men stressed the crucial importance of shaping a multi-level dimension of security that was to be confirmed as a task for NATO and for the entire international community, after the end of the Cold War.
Abstract – The NATO Rapid Deployable Corps Italy (NRDC-Italy) is one of the 9 High Rapid Force Headquarters in the NATO Force Structure.
At NRDC-Italy one can hear different languages, see different uniforms and meet persons with different cultures and backgrounds. Nations with different cultures and traditions, once opposed, have been cooperating shoulder to shoulder for years now, operating with determination, for a better future, trusting in the highest of ideals. This is the power of diversity and the strength of our multinational headquarters. We all share common values. courage, integrity, loyalty, ethos, camaraderie, honor are no strangers to the military.
In the NATO Long Term Rotation Plan the Headquarters served a one-year tour of duty supporting ISAF throughout 2013. Around 400 personnel from NRDC-ITA (among them, over 70 personnel provided by the outstanding 14 contributing Nations to NRDC-ITA HQ) took part in ISAF 2013, supporting both the strategic and the operational levels of command in Afghanistan (in both HQ ISAF and HQ IJC) in the Combined Joint Area of Operations (CJOA).
Abstract – By considering the ecclesiastical social teaching as an organic and systematic corpus, the present text outlines and analyses the most important papal documents in the social field: Leo XIII’s Rerum novarum (1891), Pius XI’s Quadragesimo anno (1931), John XXIII’s Mater et magistra (1961) and Pacem in terris (1963), Paul VI’s Populorum progressio (1967) and Octogesima adveniens (1971), John Paul II’s Laborem exercens (1981), Sollicitudo rei socialis (1987) and Centesimus annus (1991), Benedict XVI’s Caritas in veritate (2009) and Francis’s Evangelii gaudium (2013). Without theorising a rupture between a pre-conciliar Church and a post-conciliar Church, this essay aims at showing both faithful continuity and constant renewal of the Social Doctrine of the Church. As an integral part of the Christian message, the ecclesiastical social teaching is deeply rooted in the tradition of the Catholic Church. The doctrinal continuity, therefore, is not jeopardised by the inevitable differences in style and approach among the Pontiffs.
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Gli Stati Uniti nel sistema internazionale Fra continuità e mutamento
Il volume propone una lettura non effimera, in quanto non appiattita sull’attualità ma collocata in un’ottica di più lungo periodo, delle possibili trasformazioni dello scenario internazionale indotte dall’elezione di Donald Trump a Presidente degli Stati Uniti, che restano pur sempre un attore globale, l’unico in grado di influenzare tutte le aree geopolitiche. Si inserisce quindi nella tradizione della “scuola storica di analisi delle relazioni internazionali” che ha il suo centro nel Dipartimento di Scienze Politiche dell’Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore e ha prodotto, tra l’altro, precedenti volumi di questa collana.
In misura diversa secondo la disciplina di riferimento degli autori – storici delle relazioni internazionali, storici di specifiche aree geopolitiche, storici delle istituzioni politiche, scienziati della politica e cultori di studi strategici – la profondità storica dell’analisi è comunque presente. Parallelamente anche gli storici non rifuggono dall’uso di categorie politologiche. Si attua quindi non un’ibrida interdisciplinarietà, che talvolta si riscontra in opere di geopolitica ove si piega l’analisi storica al servizio di una tesi, ma un fecondo approccio multidisciplinare. Non a caso questo volume è il prodotto di una comunità scientifica nella quale è ancora viva l’eredità di Gianfranco Miglio, Preside per un trentennio della Facoltà di Scienze Politiche dell’Università Cattolica e Docente per sette anni anche di Storia dei trattati e politica internazionale, per il quale la storia è il laboratorio privilegiato della ricerca politologica.
Pur nella varietà dei temi e delle metodologie, una constatazione sembra accomunare i diversi saggi. Lo sguardo lungo, proiettato su un passato più o meno recente, permette di ridimensionare la sensazione di rottura che la presidenza Trump pare rappresentare agli occhi degli osservatori più appiattiti sugli aspetti superficiali dell’attualità. Non che si voglia del tutto negare la “novità” rappresentata dal quarantacinquesimo Presidente degli Stati Uniti; la si colloca però nel quadro di mutamenti derivanti da “forze profonde” delle quali Trump è l’approdo. E le “novità” sono talvolta un ritorno a passate esperienze. Rileva ad esempio Enrico Fassi che «l’apparente svolta incarnata dalla presidenza Trump potrebbe rivelarsi molto più in continuità con le precedenti amministrazioni USA di quanto inizialmente ritenuto».
A pochi mesi dall’insediamento, la politica estera di Trump è molto in fieri, con enunciati ancora tutti da concretizzare, come il desiderio di un rapporto costruttivo con la Russia, sfuggito completamente a Barack Obama, e la volontà di ridefinire, attraverso un duro confronto, la politica con la Cina, dichiarazioni poi fortemente ridimensionate, come quelle alquanto sprezzanti verso la NATO e i ruoli ancora da definire degli attori istituzionali all’interno della sua amministrazione.
Abstract – This book examines the possible changes which the new US President Trump may introduce in the international arena. In accordance with the academic tradition of the Department of Political Sciences of the Catholic University, the volume presents the results of a multidisciplinary and multipronged research, concentrating on both political and historical aspects. The historical perspective is intertwined to an in-depth analysis of present challenges. As an example of the issues addressed, we may mention the evolution of the Anglo-American special relationship, in particular after Brexit, the – only apparently – new approach of the US towards China, its relationship with the Russian Federation, in light of the most recent developments in the Middle Eastern area; finally, particular attention is also ensured to the discussion of the Euro-Atlantic relationship. Moreover, there will be an essay dedicated to the US domestic politics. As a result of this study, it will emerge how the new US presidency marks no sharp breaches in the American political tradition. In spite of the difficulties posed by a research conducted on current and contemporary challenges, the present collection of essays will try to respond to the need of a better comprehension of the international reality.
Abstract – The election of Donald Trump as 45th President of the United States has been associated by many observers to a threat to the liberal order and to the sunset of US hegemony. To some extent, both perspectives seem exaggerated, or at least premature. Nevertheless, a reflection on the “health status” of the liberal order, and on the role that the United States has had in its construction and its maintenance – and in what emerges as a likely disinvestment – seems particularly appropriate. The paper thus focuses on two fundamental characteristics of the order emerged in the West after the Second World War: its multilateral structure, on the one hand, and the liberal approach (in the peculiar form of the “embedded liberalism”), on the other. Both aspects, though still characterizing this order, have in fact undergone significant transformations due to changes in the systemic structure and the relative power position of the hegemonic State, and to the concrete policies it implemented. In light of these considerations, the apparent breakthrough embodied by Trump presidency could prove far more continuity with previous US administrations than initially believed. Moreover, structural changes of international politics that alter the nature of the actors involved might contribute to add further complexity to the current uncertain picture.
Abstract – Burden sharing is a traditionally contentious issue in Euro-Atlantic relations. The origin of the problem dates back to the same origin of the Atlantic Alliance and quarrels on “who have to pay for what” have systematically emerged in times of crisis. During his campaign, Donald Trump played heavily on the issue, and after the election repeatedly reiterated his will to “make Europe pay” for US military assistance. Trump’s abrasive rhetoric has raised concerns among European élites, especially in the central-eastern part of the continent, where fears of Russian expansionism are widespread. However, Trump’s rhetoric is nothing new. Obama too, in many occasions, waved the flag of burden sharing, the last time during NATO Warsaw summit in July 2016. Just like Obama and his predecessors, Trump will have to modulate his attitude according to the international context. In this perspective, his ability to re-establish better relations with Russia will be pivotal in shaping his posture towards the European allies. Currently, many important issues still divide Moscow from Washington, ranging from Ukraine to Syria, Libya and nuclear proliferation. Moreover, the Congress will probably closely scrutinize the action of the (supposedly) pro-Russia President. All these elements conjure in making détente a long-term aim. In the meantime, the fear of US disengagement could provide new fuel to Europe’s efforts to put its defence and security policy on a sounder basis.
Abstract – The outcome of the Brexit referendum and the election of Donald Trump as the 45th President of the United States laid the foundation for the strengthening of the Anglo-American special relationship in the name of the principle of national sovereignty and in presence of a shared strategic threat – the Islamic international terrorism. When the British Prime Minister, Theresa May, announced the return to Global Britain, the first countries rushing to her support were the former Imperial Dominions, particularly Australia, Canada and New Zealand, now allies and partners of the United States through security treaties and free trade agreements. Moreover, for cultural and personal reasons, President Trump seems to have an Anglophile bias. The United States and Great Britain, thus, have decided to start bilateral talks in order to reach a free trade agreement, which would have a strong political meaning. In a transitional phase for the international system, the convergence between Great Britain, the United States, Australia, Canada and New Zealand, which form together the Anglosphere, can be also a positive factor for the West as a whole.
Abstract – Nowadays American Presidents spend more and more time meeting with foreign leaders. This activity is considered “high-level public diplomacy” and it saw a six fold increase in the last seventy years; therefore, it is necessary to analyse not only the relationships with Britain’s Heads of Government, but also with its Head of State: the Monarch. Indeed, the study of the interactions between the President and the Sovereign takes on remarkable importance as it allows to examine the diplomatic bilateral activity on a different level compared to that usually reserved for Prime Ministers and Secretaries of State. In the XXth century the British Monarchs have proved to be able to use their room of manoeuvre to reach important foreign policy goals. Besides reconstructing in wide terms the framework of the official meetings between American Presidents and British Monarchs from the first post-war period to date, this study aims to deepen in particular two relevant occasions: the trip of George VI to America in June 1939, at President Roosevelt’s invitation, and the State Visit of October 1957 paid by Queen Elizabeth II to President Eisenhower.
Abstract – Transatlantic relations have long been serving as the ultimate “supply” of strategic contents in the EU’s external action, if not the EU politics as such. The Strategic Partnership (SP) may be regarded as one of the latest expressions of this aspect of the EU-US connection. The instrument, aimed at boosting the EU’s actorness and attuning it to the current configuration of the international system, has largely been dismissed as ineffective and inconsistent when applied to bilateral relations with (emerging) powers – with the significant exception of its transatlantic realization, embodied in the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). Unlike others, this partnership hinged on some of the EU’s “strongest suits”, emphasizing its identity and agenda as a “market power” – both in a “material” and a “normative” perspective. In doing so, the TTIP reaffirmed and further articulated the tenet of economic openness as a pivotal element of the international order endorsed by the two parties. That being so, the uncertain fate looming over the SP since the current US administration took office, far from being just another fiasco of the EU’s wishful foreign policy, may well be the harbinger of much more momentous changes in the transatlantic and international orders.
Abstract – This essay analyzes, from a global and long-term historical perspective, the Sino-US diplomatic tensions arisen after the Donald J. Trump’s election as President of the United States. In the broader system of international relations, the so-called “rise of China” and the increasing political and economic dynamism of the new Asian Great Powers are leading to the closure of the Euro-Atlantic global hegemonic cycle, begun with the «Great Divergence» in the late XVIIIth century and enshrined by the Opium Wars in the second half of the XIXth. Despite an unconventional diplomatic style, the new Republican President and his administration are facing these systemic transformations in the field of world politics, trying to create a new architecture of global governance, aiming at maintaining the United States’ leadership within a world system that is structurally transiting from an hegemony to another, while is moving from the unipolar condition to a multipolar one.
Abstract – In the aftermath of the Russian Federation’s regressive and revolutionary intervention in the Ukrainian crisis, the choices that the Trump Administration is called upon to implement towards Moscow represent a key challenge for the White House as well as an important test for the management of the most important vectors of the US foreign policy. Besides concerning the institutional future of Ukraine, the crisis affects the most important elements of Russian-US bilateral relationship and, more generally, of the post-bipolar systematization of the Eurasian area. Against this background, the essay aims to frame the challenges brought by Moscow to the Trump Administration in the broader context of the post-bipolar relations between Washington and Moscow. In particular, it aims to frame the need to reinvent the US Russian policy within the failure of the traditional congagement strategy pursued toward Moscow.
Abstract – More than six years after the outbreak of the Arab Spring, both Syria and Iraq have to cope with a series of challenges threatening their inner coherence and their survival as unitarian states. Deeply divided along ethno-sectarian and regional lines and marked by the emergence of internal oppositions questioning the very legitimacy of their governments, Damascus and Baghdad have witnessed the entrenchment of competing power centers within their own territories backed by a broad array of external players. The involvement of these actors contributed to complicate even further the regional scenario, favoring the overlapping of civil and proxy wars. Moving from these elements the essay aims at tracing the equilibriums dominating the Iraqi and Syrian scenarios, the relations Washington established with the key-players on the ground as well as the policy options the new U.S. administration can count on.
Abstract – Over the last fifteen years, there has been a growing consensus among academic studies and news stories about the emergence in the United States of a sort of presidential Monarchy. Thirty years after the decline of Schlesinger’s “Imperial Presidency”, a concept used to describe the expansion of presidential powers in the wake of the Cold War, it seems that the US Presidency is experiencing the resurgence of an effective unilateral executive power, both in domestic and foreign policy areas. It should be noted that this presidential discretionary power is primarily administrative in nature and rely not only on executive orders, but also on other “tools”, such as signing statements, memoranda, presidential guidelines, regulatory statutes and, last but not least, the power of appointment. This essay aims at clarifying the nature and extent of the presidential administrative power, which from Reagan to Obama has increased at a fast pace, thanks to factors such as the “presidentialization” of American politics and the inefficiency of congressional lawmaking. While the first part of the essay places the presidential administrative power in an historical perspective, focusing mainly upon the last thirty-five years, the second part is dedicated to Barack Obama’s use of the presidential administrative action. The result is a sketch of the main trends in the historical development of presidential administrative practices that have become a valuable legacy to any incoming President – especially so in the case of Donald Trump. These major trends may have important implications as both a source of legitimation of presidential unilateral actions as well as a springboard for the introduction of new and innovative executive power practices.
Atti del IX Convegno di studio sull’Alleanza Atlantica La lotta al terrorismo transnazionale: un ruolo per la NATO?
Il presente numero pubblica nella prima parte le relazioni pervenute e pubblicabili presentate al IX Convegno di studio sull’Alleanza Atlantica: La lotta al terrorismo transnazionale: un ruolo per la NATO? Nella sezione Miscellanea compaiono due articoli su aspetti del pensiero cristiano, cattolico e ortodosso, in campo politico.
Abstract – La conferenza continua una lunga tradizione di studi sulla sicurezza internazionale e sull’Alleanza Atlantica in particolare, che impegna il Dipartimento di Scienze Politiche dell’Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore con il sostegno costante della Divisione di Diplomazia Pubblica della NATO nonché di altre istituzioni militari e culturali. Questo IX Convegno intende far luce sui molteplici aspetti strategici, politici e religiosi della minaccia del terrorismo transnazionale e sulle possibili risposte sul fronte interno e oltremare da parte della NATO.
Abstract – Fino a pochi anni fa, il compito principale della NATO era lo schieramento “fuori area”. In Europa, l’Alleanza rimaneva “vigilant and prepared”, ma nessuno pensava realmente che ci sarebbe stato bisogno di un intervento. Tuttavia, alla vigilia dello scoppio della crisi in Ucraina, c’erano stati segni che facevano pensare che quella fase stesse giungendo a conclusione. Fra questi, si ricordi il ritiro degli Stati Uniti dall’Iraq e, soprattutto, dall’Afghanistan, dove la NATO stava chiudendo la più importante missione della sua storia. L’emergere della minaccia transnazionale dello Stato Islamico (Dā’ish) non cambiava lo stato delle cose. Allo stesso tempo, il deteriorarsi delle relazioni con la Russia ha portato l’Alleanza all’approvazione del nuovo Readiness Action Plan, a rafforzare il suo schieramento militare lungo il confine orientale e ad istituire una Very High Readiness Joint Task Force di quattromila uomini. Stiamo tornando alla Guerra Fredda? No, dato che il confronto attuale fra NATO e Russia non è da considerarsi alla stregua di uno scontro ideologico globale; piuttosto, la sfida posta da Putin è l’espressione del tradizionale interesse nazionale russo di preservare la propria sfera di influenza. Nel contesto strategico odierno, il rischio principale è dunque che la NATO dedichi troppe risorse alla risposta alla minaccia russa, a spese di altri scenari, a cominciare da quello mediorientale. Una NATO vigile in Europa è un fatto positivo, ma non è abbastanza, se essa non è pronta a fronteggiare la minaccia principale, ovunque essa emerga.
Abstract – Il presente saggio cerca di rispondere ad una domanda fondamentale: “Come mai il concetto di terrorismo è rimasto lo stesso di quello riferito a Brigate Rosse, ETA, IRA e altri gruppi simili?”. Anche se non c’era motivo di convincersi dell’esistenza di un terrorismo “tradizionale”, ciò ci ha permesso di credere che fossimo in possesso di norme e politiche appropriate per combattere questo fenomeno. Il terrorismo del nuovo millennio, è di tipo diverso e può esser compreso solo come parte della nuova “guerra ibrida”, ossia un tipo di conflitto pervasivo, diffuso e demoralizzato, che caratterizza i giorni nostri, con Daesh come attore fondamentale. Il problema è che, per ragioni politiche, tale concetto “invasivo” di “guerra ibrida” non è stato accettato, così che ci si trova tuttora impreparati ad affrontare la minaccia che ne deriva.
Abstract – Il 2015 ha visto l’avvio della nuova missione della NATO in Afghanistan: Resolute Support (RS). A causa del deterioramento della sicurezza e dell’incapacità delle forze afghane di garantire un minimo livello di sicurezza, colpite da grandi perdite, diserzioni e forte corruzione, gli Stati Uniti hanno avviato un’ulteriore revisione del piano di disimpegno: uno sforzo pari a 10.000 soldati, oltre ai quali 5.000 militari della NATO, sino a tutto il 2017. Sul terreno, prosegue incontrastata l’offensiva dei talebani, in grado di detenere il controllo di circa il 20% del territorio e la capacità di operare efficacemente in un altro 30%. Inoltre, gli sviluppi del percorso per la pace avviati dal Quadrilateral Coordination Group (Cina, Pakistan, Stati Uniti, Afghanistan ma, al momento, non i talebani) sono in bilico a causa del rischio di tre fattori principali. Il primo è l’impasse politica della diarchia di potere (Ghani-Abdullah), incapace di dare al paese un governo in grado di operare. Il secondo è la frammentazione del fronte insurrezionale, conseguenza della morte del mullah Omar e di una leadership insurrezionale non più condivisa (quella del mullah Mohammad Aktar Mansour). Infine, terzo fattore, è la penetrazione in Afghanistan del nuovo attore della violenza, lo Stato islamico (IS/Daesh), che potrebbe trasformare una guerra di liberazione nazionale (il punto di vista dei talebani) in guerra globale fortemente ideologizzata. È l’evoluzione di un fenomeno che è corretto definire “Nuovo Terrorismo Insurrezionale”.
Abstract – The “Syraq” represents one of the main junctures of an arch of crisis stretching all over the Middle Eastern region. While the success of this geo-political term is deeply related with the emergence of the auto-proclaimed “Islamic State”, other factors contributed to the “strategic merging” of two countries whose relations have always been defined by open competition and whose destinies appeared to be – just a few years ago – completely different. A situation that has been deeply affected by what could be defined as a game of shadow played by multiple actors that are altering equilibriums that dominated the area for decades. A competition that risks to threaten the very foundation of the post-first world war order. And, with it, the lives of entire communities. The paper aims at analysing the dynamics defining the Syrian and Iraqi theatres through a multipronged approach taking in exam the evolution of IS presence in the region, the deep fragmentation of the Syrian and Iraqi polities, the critical role played by a wide array of local actors and the influence exerted by key regional and extra-regional players.
Abstract – The Coup d’État in Ukraine was the moment when the post-Cold War world genuinely ended for Russia. After February 2014, Putin has been remarkably successful in frustrating Western projects on former Soviet territory: he has halted NATO expansion, strengthened the role of Collective Security Treaty Organization, consolidated Russian friendship with China, Iran, India, Afghanistan, Syria, Serbia, Egypt, Greece, Israel, tightened his hold on Crimea, and, thanks to the Ukrainian adventure and the Russian military intervention in Syria, he took the West by an unpleasant and humiliating surprise. Nevertheless, Moscow’s diplomatic restart and the Russian modest military revival did not change the situation. Europe alone vastly outranges Russia in economic strength and military spending. America’s global reach is unparalleled. Despite the refusal by most European States to invest in their militaries, Moscow still lack the strength to stage a continental Blitzkrieg. The NATO-Russia Council (April 20th, 2016) has not led to change anyone’s mind. Sanctions remain in force, even if they have not transformed Moscow’s behaviour, while, by contrast, they have discouraged Russian cooperation with NATO on issues including Islamic terrorism, North Korea, Iran, Iraq, Syria and Afghanistan. Even worse, the Western economic attack has pushed Moscow toward Beijing, despite important differences between the two countries.
Abstract – Dopo la fine della Guerra Fredda, prospettive analitiche differenti nello studio delle Relazioni Internazionali hanno fornito resoconti contrastanti circa l’abilità della NATO di sopravvivere al venir meno della minaccia sovietica, mantenendo al contempo un ruolo significativo nel sistema internazionale post-bipolare. Mentre i teorici liberali e costruttivisti hanno ritenuto che l’Alleanza avrebbe continuato a rivestire un ruolo importante, le valutazioni dei realisti sono state più pessimiste, mettendo in discussione la possibilità per la NATO di risultare rilevante in un sistema internazionale in rapida trasformazione. Le analisi neo-marxiste hanno ritratto l’Alleanza come strumento nelle mani di un gruppo di Stati capitalisti impegnati nel perpetrare strategie neo-colonialiste di sfruttamento al di fuori dell’area euro-atlantica. Le prospettive post-positiviste sono altresì risultate critiche, ritenendo che la rilevanza della NATO continui a fondarsi sull’abilità di riprodurre e rappresentare ancora l’Occidente come spazio geo-culturale nonché immagine della sicurezza. Un quarto di secolo dopo il crollo dell’Unione Sovietica, questo dibattito è ancora acceso. La conclusione del saggio è che, mentre la maggior parte dei membri dell’Alleanza mantiene un interesse per la sua sopravvivenza, dinamiche sistemiche di una certa portata hanno considerevolmente minato le visioni liberali e costruttiviste della NATO.
Abstract – The relation between the Atlantic Alliance and its partners has little directly to do with the role that the former can play in the war against transnational terrorism. However, it can exert a relevant influence on its political posture, especially affecting the consensus building process. Since mid-Nineties, the Atlantic Alliance has expanded its geographic scope. While enhancing its operational capabilities and allowing it to extend the reach of its “security umbrella”, this process has made more and more difficult the building of a “meaningful” consensus, i.e. a consensus that is not a mere juxtaposition of multiple national priorities. At the same time, it has deeply affected the Alliance’s structure, promoting the emergence of a sort of “star-shaped organization”, with a central core including the member countries connected in different ways to a loose network of partners, whose participation in NATO’s activities largely rests on the convergence of their mutual interests. This state of things somehow recalls the principle “the mission determines the coalition” that the US administration posed as a base of its security policy when Donald Rumsfeld was Secretary of Defence, in 2001-2006. In this perspective, the “star-shaped NATO” appears as a sort of toolbox, in which the assets of both members and partners can be assembled freely, according to the needs of the different missions and the interest that the subjects have in discharging them. A potentially dangerous situation if – as in present-day fragmented Alliance – no subject can play a balancing role and provide the political guidance that the United States have provided until very recent times.
Abstract – In the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, NATO invoked the collective defense article of the Washington treaty for the first time in its history. The United States welcomed the Atlantic solidarity, but it did not involve the Alliance in major combat operations of the so-called war on terror either in Afghanistan or in Iraq. During the Bush presidency, indeed, NATO had been subordinated to the coalition of the willing format, which was more flexible and subjected to Washington’s needs and priorities. Anyway, Allied forces proved to be important in Afghanistan in the post-combat phases of the war on terror. Initially the NATO-led international mission ISAF was a source of convergence between the two sides of the Atlantic, but over the years it turned out to be a source of disagreement. The Obama presidency has shown several continuities with the previous administration, particularly for the marginal role reserved to NATO in combating first al-Qaeda, then the Islamic State. What’s next for NATO in the fight against terrorism when a new President will enter the White House in 2017? Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump are the frontrunners of the two parties, but while for the former NATO is apparently marginal, the latter has already dismissed it as outdated.
Periphery since the Cold War (1961-2016)
Abstract – Il saggio descrive la posizione tedesca riguardo i temi di difesa e terrorismo e si basa su un’ampia indagine storica sulla NATO, dato che il funzionamento dell’Alleanza è tuttora affidato ai principi enunciati durante la Guerra Fredda nonostante i molti e decisivi cambiamenti strategici, militari e politici dal 1990 a oggi. Durante la Guerra Fredda, la Germania era, seppur limitatamente, preparata a difendere i fianchi dell’Alleanza, soprattutto in termini militari, dato che il punto fondamentale era quello della difesa da possibili attacchi provenienti dal Patto di Varsavia, lungo l’Elba. In termini politici e soprattutto economici, il sostegno proveniente da Bonn, specialmente per il fianco Sud, era maggiore, ma presentava anche chiari limiti. La stessa situazione si presenta oggi. Certamente vi sono stati importanti cambiamenti dal 1990, fra cui il più importante è stata la missione della Bundeswehr in Afghanistan. Tuttavia, la Germania non è ancora preparata ad impegnarsi oltre certe ben precise restrizioni. Nel frattempo, e magari la missione in Afghanistan rappresenterà un’eccezione storica, l’azione politica, militare e strategica della NATO è tornata a concentrarsi sugli stessi confini che aveva durante la Guerra Fredda. Per quanto riguarda la guerra al terrorismo, che non rientra fra le principali competenze della NATO, la Germania, come gli altri membri, farà tutto il necessario per garantire la sicurezza nazionale, tuttavia missioni militari estese sono da escludersi con ogni probabilità.
Abstract – Le relazioni fra NATO e Turchia potrebbero trovarsi ad un punto di svolta, tanto che recentemente, e come mai prima d’ora, molte critiche si sono levate contro Ankara, arrivando persino a suggerirne l’espulsione dall’Alleanza. Le ragioni che hanno portato a questa crisi sono molteplici: da una parte, l’accusa alla Turchia di aver appoggiato, quanto meno indirettamente, lo Stato Islamico e, dall’altra, il rischio di un confronto fra NATO e Mosca causato nel novembre 2015 dall’abbattimento del jet russo in territorio turco; il paese, inoltre, sembra colpito da una svolta autoritaria in politica interna, con episodi di dura repressione e censura. Non bisogna dimenticare poi come la Turchia sia sempre rimasta focalizzata sulla cosiddetta “questione curda”, percepita come principale minaccia alla sicurezza nazionale, scenario ancor più complicato dall’intrecciarsi con l’evoluzione dello Stato Islamico. La Turchia si trova così al centro di un paradosso, che la vede teoricamente schierata nelle file di un’Alleanza di cui sembra non condividere gli obiettivi. Quali prospettive per nuovi o rinnovati fronti di cooperazione?
Abstract – Building on the experience acquired fighting homegrown terrorism during the “leaden years” Italy has been able to effectively contrast radical Islamic terrorism since its inception. Having realized that the terrorist menace is equally present on both the National and International theatres Italy quickly overcame the previous distinction between the exclusive competences of the public security forces, which only fought terrorists inside Italy, and the armed forces, which faced terrorist only outside of the Italian borders. The two now operate in a coordinated fashion as parts of a comprehensive strategy which until now has been quite effective. Today thousands of soldiers aid the forces of the Ministry of Interiors to control the territory while the Carabinieri participate in International missions together with the other Armed Forces and together with the Italian Police provide training to the security forces of friendly countries, especially in the MENA region. With regards to operations in the Middle East and North Africa Italy is present as one of the major, when not the major, European contributor. The Italian doctrine for participation in international operations requires that a number of conditions be met, such as the presence of a legitimate government, the approval of the UN and a coalition involving other western countries; the absence of these explains why Italy is not operating in Syria and why it is waiting for further developments in Libya. The doctrine however is currently under review, and in so doing Italian authorities will need to take into account, among other things, the results of the implementation of the new White Book on Defence, the outcome of the next NATO summit, and the security and defence policy chosen by the next US President.
Abstract – The evolution of the international scenario is more and more putting at risk the security of Italy. The threat of Islamic terrorism, the Mediterranean instability and the return of Russia on the international scene, are forcing Italy to take some important decisions regarding foreign and defence policies. The Defence White Paper takes into account all these changes and clearly defines the priorities, primarily the Mediterranean and Europe, and accordingly establishes the scope of intervention of the military. However, Italy still does not seem to perceive the significance of these changes, started after 2011 and the so called Arab Spring, as the same Defence budget 2016 shows. Unlike the other large European countries, Italy has not increased the funds for the Defence and continues to allocate a limited amount of them to the Exercise, in particular to the expenditure for training and maintainance, so that, for example, among other consequences, the Army can only count on 25% of its fleet of vehicles. Such a situation, in the long period, may not be sustainable, considered the relevance of the threat and the further military commitments that Italy intends to undertake.
Abstract – Eugenio Pacelli was born a hundred and forty years ago, in March 1876, and was elected Pope in 1939, assuming the name of Pius XII. He represented one of the major figures of the Twentieth Century, during the tragic period of nationalism, totalitarianism, total politics and subsequent world wars. Many studies, even if not always favorable, have already been conducted on Pope Pacelli’s personality and on his office. Notwithstanding some prejudices, some progresses have also brought new acknowledgements to the conduct of the Pope who led the Church during the tragic years of the Second World War and of the Soviet attempt to extend its dominion during following period. The focus of this essay is the concept of society and of State as emerged during Pope Pius XII’s office. Something worth mentioning is that during his pontificate Pope Pius XII never issued any encyclical letter specifically dedicated to a social theme. However, many times and in a profound way did he express his teaching concerning socio-political matters through his famous radio messages, many addresses as well as in many different occasions.
Abstract – Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the so-called “post-Soviet space” has undergone several processes of political, economic, social, cultural as well as juridical transformation. The economic relations, as well as the ones among the citizens of the new independent States, remain very tight. Major developments are to be found in the economic sector, with the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) representing the most recent community of this kind. However, the respect of a set of values, rights and fundamental freedoms is the only key allowing the evolution towards a higher level of integration: the essay is mainly focused on the evaluation of this aspect and of the agreements and tools developed in the context of the international organizations operating in the post-Soviet space (EAEU and the Commonwealth of Independent States).
Alla ricerca della rotta transatlantica dopo l’11 settembre 2001
Le relazioni tra Europa e Stati Uniti durante la presidenza George W. Bush
Il volume rielabora, con revisione del testo e aggiornamenti bibliografici, la ricerca svolta nel 2008 per il Centro Militare di Studi Strategici, che l’Autore ringrazia per l’autorizzazione all’utilizzo. Il volume inoltre riprende per gli anni più recenti l’argomento della precedente opera Europa-Stati Uniti: un Atlantico più largo?, pubblicata nel 2001 nella collana del Ce.Mi.S.S. presso l’editore Franco Angeli. Il periodo in essa affrontato si arrestava infatti alle elezioni presidenziali americane del novembre 2000, quasi un anno prima degli attentati del terrorismo islamico sul territorio americano dell’11 settembre 2001, che aprirono una nuova fase delle relazioni internazionali e soprattutto, svanita la luna di miele iniziale, peggiorarono le già difficili relazioni tra le due sponde dell’Atlantico. La ricostruzione storica dei rapporti transatlantici nel lungo periodo, durante la Guerra Fredda e negli anni ’90 del secolo XX, viene richiamata, ove necessario, per mostrare continuità e discontinuità rispetto agli anni più recenti.
Le relazioni transatlantiche possono essere analizzate a diversi livelli di profondità. L’analisi meno illuminante è quella di politici e giornalisti, appiattita sul breve periodo, che ha attribuito la crisi principalmente alla linea dell’amministrazione Bush; se il commentatore era più obiettivo, incolpava anche la rigidità della coppia Chirac-Schröder, parallela all’unilateralismo del Presidente americano.
Assai più valida è la prospettiva degli studiosi di scienza politica e di studi strategici, che già negli anni ’90 avevano descritto la tensione dei rapporti transatlantici, indicando giustamente come la rivoluzione geopolitica conseguente alla caduta del muro di Berlino avesse minato la coesione dell’Occidente, più forte durante la Guerra Fredda. La caduta delle Torri Gemelle, un decennio dopo la dissoluzione dell’Unione Sovietica, non ha fatto altro che accentuare una crisi già in atto.
Un terzo e più approfondito livello di analisi colloca gli avvenimenti dell’ultimo quarto abbondante di secolo in una prospettiva storica di più lungo periodo. In altre parole, la crisi delle relazioni euro-americane per la guerra all’Iraq è stata certo aggravata da errori ed eccessi polemici imputabili a policymakers e opinion leaders, ma è stata comunque il riflesso di mutamenti strutturali del sistema internazionale che hanno rimesso in primo piano un diverso approccio alle relazioni internazionali che ha una profondità storica di lungo periodo. Sintetizzando al massimo una delle tesi di fondo qui sostenute, si può affermare che il periodo della Guerra Fredda ha costituito una parentesi di coesione tra due epoche nelle quali l’approccio degli Stati Uniti e dei Paesi europei alla realtà internazionale è stato profondamente diverso, perché diverse sono la loro cultura politica ed esperienza storica. Senza peraltro dimenticare che comunque Europa e Stati Uniti restano oggi le due civiltà più simili nel contesto mondiale.
L’ottavo convegno annuale promosso dal Dipartimento di Scienze Politiche dell’Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore sui temi della sicurezza internazionale, con particolare riferimento al ruolo della NATO, si svolge come in passato con il patrocinio di diverse istituzioni civili e militari, rappresentate qui dai loro massimi esponenti, che desidero ringraziare per il costante sostegno a queste iniziative. Tra le prime, la Facoltà di Scienze Politiche e Sociali, la Divisione Diplomazia Pubblica della NATO, l’Atlantic Treaty Association, presieduta dallo scorso anno per la prima volta da un italiano, il Prof. Fabrizio Luciolli, che è anche Presidente del Comitato Atlantico Italiano. Tra le istituzioni militari, il Centro Alti Studi per la Difesa, l’“università” delle Forze Armate italiane, il Comando Militare Esercito Lombardia e il NATO Rapid Deployable Corps – Italy, il cui Comandante, Gen. C.A. Riccardo Marchiò non può con suo rammarico essere presente perché impegnato nella fase finale dell’esercitazione Trident Jaguar 2015, che concluderà il passaggio del suo comando da struttura delle forze terrestri a organismo interforze.
Abstract – The conference continues a long-standing tradition of studies on international security (in particular on the Atlantic Alliance) that the Department of Political Sciences of the Catholic University of the Sacred Heart pursues with the constant support of NATO Public Diplomacy Division and other military and cultural institutions. This eighth conference aims at shedding light on the perspectives that the Newport summit opened to NATO and on the Alliance’s apparent return to the “old mission” embodied in the couple “Deterrence & defence”, following a long period of deployment out-of-area.
Massimo de Leonardis, La NATO dopo il vertice di Newport e in attesa del nuovo Presidente americano: “masterly inactivity”
Abstract – Until a short time ago, NATO’s main role was its deployment out-of-area. In Europe, the Alliance remained “vigilant and prepared”, but no one really believed in the need for its engagement. However, at the eve of the outbreak of the Ukraine crisis, there were signs that the period of the “NATO deployed” was coming to an end. Among them: the US withdrawal from Iraq and – most important – Afghanistan, where NATO was discharging the most relevant mission in its history. The emergence of the transnational threat of the Islamic State (Dā‘ish) did not affect this state of things. At the same time, the deterioration of the relations with Russia has led the Alliance to approve a new NATO Readiness Action Plan, to strengthen its military deployment along the Eastern borders and to establish a 4,000-men-strong Very High Readiness Joint Task Force. Is the Cold War coming back? Not at all, since the present NATO-Russia confrontation is not an ideological struggle; rather, Putin’s challenge is an expression of the “traditional” Russian national interest of preserving its sphere of influence. In the current strategic environment, the main risk is thus that NATO devotes too many resources to face the Russian threat at the expenses of the other theatres, especially in the Middle East. A vigilant NATO in Europe is a positive thing, but not enough if it is not ready to face the main threat wherever it emerges.
Gianluca Pastori, L’Alleanza Atlantica e la lotta al terrorismo internazionale: breve storia di un rapporto difficile
Abstract – The fight against international terrorism is one of the great challenges that the Atlantic Alliance and NATO are currently facing. Starting soon after 9/11, the Alliance has gradually developed its own doctrinary corpus, based on the three pillars of awareness, capabilities and engagement. This corpus is embodied in a series of documents ranging from the Military Concept for the Defence against Terrorism (MC-472, 2002), to the Strategic Concept (“Active Engagement, Modern Defence”) adopted in Lisbon in 2010, to the NATO’s Policy Guidelines on Counter-Terrorism, adopted in Chicago in 2012. However, strong reserves still exist about NATO’s ability to develop an effective counter-terrorism action. Its historical heritage and “reactive” character, as well as its nature of military organization, are normally quoted as the main obstacles in this sense. Presently, the Alliance seems thus trapped somewhere in between the two roles, while the possibility of an evolution remains uncertain. Traditionally, operational needs have been the main driver of NATO’s change. Today, instead, this element conjures with the financial constraints affecting NATO member States to promote a different kind of change, focused more on the Alliance’s military dimension than on its potential role of security broker.
Davide Borsani, “Back in business?”. Il dibattito sulla NATO negli Stati Uniti
Abstract – In 2014, the United States and Europe faced many controversial diplomatic and military dynamics. Until 2013, NATO was requested to unravel two main Gordian knots that would have determined its future: the commitment in Afghanistan and the burden sharing issue. However, today the Atlantic Alliance has revised the nature of its priorities, essentially due to the Ukrainian crisis. The United States, the majority shareholder of NATO, has undertaken a similar path by rethinking the role of the Alliance in its grand strategy. Nevertheless, Washington should still address a fundamental question for the future of the Western alliance: is America still an Atlantic power or has it returned to its historical vocation toward Asia? During President Obama’s first term, in fact, NATO was not at the core of the US foreign policy. Is this maybe the symptom that the Alliance has finally turned into the already predicted relic of the Cold War? Obama’s second term has instead shown a different approach toward Europe. Nowadays, the American debate on NATO is focusing on what is happening not only in Eastern Europe but also in the Greater Middle East. What kind of tasks and what prospects for the post-2014 NATO, then? In the US, the discussion is still open.
Abstract – The section discusses the new challenge posed by Russia and the possibility that NATO will get back to a more traditional strategy. The author sees a likeness between the German situation in 1919 and Russian one in 1991. Both people had their compatriots in others countries, both countries suffered from a huge inflation and their military class did not accept the defeat. Moreover, another and most important likeness needs to be highlighted: Germany surrendered but hoped that Wilson’s Fourteen Points would be followed, which did not happen; at the end of the Cold War, the situation was somehow similar. Indeed, Bush and Gorbachev tried to create a New International Order, which meant a coordination between the two Super Powers, but this cooperation was opposed by different influent members of the American leadership. The situation worsened during Clinton’s Presidency and after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. President Clinton chose the “democratic enlargement” in the Eastern Europe and accepted new members in NATO. Additionally, after the peacekeeping mission in Somalia, he decided to take part in other international missions only when the national interest was affected. From that moment, the expression “national interests” was used to justify all the actions in international politics, which opened a new period of instability and recalled old fears.
Abstract – The paper debates the relations between the Atlantic Alliance and Russia in the broader context of transatlantic and European security. The first part of the paper focuses on the sources of the growing tension between NATO and Moscow in the aftermath of the Euromaidan revolution in 2013 and the annexation of Crimea in the following year. The second part of the paper provides a brief historical summary of the relations between the Atlantic Alliance and Moscow and formulates a few policy suggestions which might favour an improvement in mutual perceptions. Although the relationship between the Atlantic Alliance and Moscow reached its post-Cold War nadir following the Euromaidan events, the current situation represents only the latest chapter of a crisis, whose immediate origins have to be found in the events of the early 21st century. Indeed, it was at that time that the Atlantic Alliance’s enlargement to the Baltic states and the so-called colored revolutions in Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan outlined deep strategic divergences between the West and Moscow. Nonetheless, the very root of this tension shall be found in the years 1989-1990, with the end of the East-West division and the pending question concerning the role of the Soviet Union and its successor states in the new architecture of the European security. The nature of that situation triggered mutual mistrusts and contrasting perceptions, which have prevented the establishment of a constructive relationship and still continue to fuel tension between the Atlantic Alliance and Moscow.
Abstract – There is a myth concerning a special relationship between Russia and Germany. A myth always contains a part of truth and a lot of simplification. The most important milestones of this relationship are 1812, 1870, 1922, 1972. Tsar Peter the Great was the first leader trying to create a connection between his country and the German world. On the other side, king Frederick the Great sent ambassadors to Russia to understand the culture of that empire. The Napoleonic wars put strictly in contact Prussia and Russia and so did the peace after those wars. Bismarck’s era is seen as the period of maximum convergence between Prussia-Germany and Russia, but the relation was actually much more complicated. The Treaty of Rapallo was signed in 1922. This German-Soviet pact must be seen as the extrema ratio of German government, which had already tried to reach an agreement with Great Britain. Actually, the most important limit of the German politic with Russia was that Berlin did not see Moscow as a real interlocutor. In the 1970s the two countries rediscovered themselves thanks to the Ostpolitik. Germany appreciated that Soviet Union did not interfere in the reunification of the country. After the Cold War, the economic factor was the link between Germany and Russia. In this way, Berlin gained access to the Eastern European markets and became the continental epicentre. The good relationship continued under Schroeder and Merkel. 2008 marked the worst period in the relationship between EU and Russia, but Germany maintained important economic relations with Moscow. Even if Germany is one of the countries that want a dialog with Putin, the Ukrainian crisis made a fact clear: Germany is a regulatory power, while Russia follows a traditional realpolitik. If Germany wants to maintain a leadership in Europe, it has to change its idea of “leadership” and “intervention”. In the present situation, Germany has to make a “containment by integration” with Russia, or it will became the border of a divided world.
Abstract – The presentation focuses on the entire duration (over thirteen years) of the ISAF mission and the follow-on Resolute Support mission. The closing remarks present the Author’s personal point of view about the mission, rather than solutions to the problem. The Author deployed four times to Afghanistan, first time was in 2001-2002, then in 2003, afterwards in 2007 and, more recently, from January 2013 to January 2014 as the Chief of Staff of the mission, at ISAF Headquarters. As such, he had a great opportunity to witness first-hand how much Afghanistan has changed, and how – in Author’s opinion – the country is moving in the right direction.
Abstract – During the Cold War, NATO maritime planning was a task performed by the Supreme Allied Command Atlantic (SACLANT), while the other maritime Command, the CinC Channel (CINCHAN), was responsible for controlling the “Eastern Approaches” to Europe, the sea area where the reinforcement and resupply convoys, dispatched from the American continent, were supposed to arrive. In 1952, SACLANT issued a number of “Concepts of Maritime Operations”, defining five sea campaigns, which was approved by the North Atlantic Council. The evolution of NATO strategic doctrine caused this document to be revised in 1967 and then in 1980. During this period, SACLANT also developed the concept of “Maritime Contingency Forces” to be used both in peace and tension time. These forces were composed by one warship from each nation. It is worth noting that, while NATO focused its attention to the North Atlantic area, close to the main bases of the Soviet fleet, the major maritime crisis took place in the Mediterranean, as a consequence of the Arab-Israeli wars. A Soviet squadron, based in Alexandria, Egypt, posed a permanent threat to NATO, especially as far as the support to Greece and Turkey, in case of hostilities, was concerned. The end of the Warsaw Pact and the subsequent implosion of the Soviet Union led to a period of crisis response operations, which saw an intensive participation by NATO naval forces. However, the replacement of SACLANT by a new Command, the Strategic Allied Command-Transformation (SAC-T), led to the loss of maritime expertise, as SHAPE staff was predominantly focused on air-land operations. Several years elapsed, therefore, until the lessons learned through this activity led, in 2011, to the most recent NATO Maritime Strategy. While this document is a follow-up of the NATO Strategic Concept, it introduces a new task, Maritime Security Operations, which reflects the Alliance’s commitment of using naval forces during peace, tension and crises.
Abstract – NATO was created as a strong link between North America and Europe. Its first goal was to deter Soviet Union from invading Western Europe. NATO fleets had to protect and control the Atlantic Ocean, which represented the major line of communication between America and Europe. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, the number of operations increased for NATO fleets. Missions took place in the Adriatic Sea, in the Persian Gulf, and in the Arabic Sea. The western fleets are, nowadays, a tool of naval diplomacy, and they perform mostly a constabulary role. The organization has been simplified, and a new command was established in Mons, Belgium, together with a new naval command in Northwood, UK (MARCOM). MARCOM head is the Prime Maritime Advisor to the Alliance, while the Command is responsible for the maritime component of the NATO Responce Force, based on four Standing Maritime Groups. MARCOM leads (or led) the operations Ocean Shield, Allied Provider, Allied Protector and Active Endeavour, and controls the NATO Commander Maritime Air and the Commander Submarine NATO. Not surprisingly, the exercise Nobel Justification (October 2014) and other operations have recently shown that NATO Navy is still a strong, flexible, and rapidly deployable military force.
Abstract – Initially, NATO and US reaction to the Ukrainian events in 2014 was rather weak, also due to the strategic surprise that Russia achieved. Nevertheless, it has grown stronger during the months. Land, sea and air assets increased in number, due both to the strengthening of the existing forces and to the conduction of large scale exercises, such as Saber Strike 2014 and Combined Resolve II. The Newport summit reaffirmed NATO’s commitment also with the adoption of a Readiness Action Plan, in order to deal with the new challenges that the Alliance is facing. The other pillar of the post-Newport NATO posture is the establishment of the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VHRJTF, also known as “Spearhead force”). VHRJTF – a 5,000-men-strong multinational brigade – should reach full operation status by 2016, becoming the pillar of the NATO Response Force (established at the NATO Prague summit on 22 November 2002, which reached its Full Operational Capability in 2006), and its main aim should be to provide a credible force of dissuasion to reassure first and foremost the Alliance’s Eastern and Baltic members.
Oggi, con l’abitudine ai giochi di parole in inglese, anche noi parliamo della contrapposizione tra welfare e warfare: un tempo si sarebbe detto tra burro e cannoni. Ogni tanto ricorre il facile e demagogico slogan: quanti ospedali avremmo potuto costruire comprando meno F-35, oppure quante scuole rinunciando alla portaerei Cavour? In una fase di ri-nazionalizzazione delle politiche estere e di difesa, al di là della retorica uffi ciale, certo l’Italianon può rinunciare a una capacità militare, sia pure su scala ridotta, a tutto campo.
Il tema trattato è quanto mai di attualità, in un momento nel qualeda un lato la crisi economica generalizzata, dall’altro il relativo disimpegno americano dall’Europa, per la priorità strategica di altre aree geopolitiche, impongono agli Stati europei dell’Alleanza, e quindi alla UE, alla quale appartiene la maggior parte di essi, scelte fondamentali.
Abstract – The conference continues a long-standing tradition of studies on international security, in particular on the Atlantic Alliance, by the Department of Political Sciences of the Catholic University of the Sacred Heart. The 2013 conference analyses the old problem of funding defence budgets, which has always been central in the history of NATO. In general, complaints by the military personnel about insufficient budgets in time of peace are a constant for all times and all countries. Today, this issue appears as the dilemma between Welfare and Warfare, so much debated by the Western public opinions. This topic is very important especially at a time when the 2008 economic crisis plus the US disengagement from the Old Continent push the European members of the Atlantic Alliance, and the European Union too, to make fundamental strategic choices.
Silvano Frigerio, Lo Strumento Militare nazionale nell’ottica delle iniziative NATO SMART DEFENCE e UE POOLING AND SHARING
Abstract – In periods of economic crisis, participation in cooperative development plans is an important opportunity for those countries, such as Italy, which want to play a major role in the world. Within the Atlantic and European frameworks, the NATO SMART DEFENCE and EU POOLING AND SHARING initiatives intend to integrate and optimize land, sea and air components of the Armed Forces. These initiatives also aim at improving the quality of the military in order to increase their effectiveness and their practical utility for foreign policies. The substance of these initiatives is not only to “do more with less”, but to “do better with less”. Italy has adopted a proactive approach, despite the several defence cuts recently applied. In particular, in the transatlantic context, our country fully supports the need for Europe to play a major role. International cooperation is perhaps the only way to maintain the current level of interoperability and of advanced capabilities required in our strategic environment.
Abstract – Several formulas have been devised since the creation of the Atlantic Alliance to address and try to solve the “burden sharing” problem of unbalanced military budgets between the US and Europe. Each formula has reflected a particular strategic vision of NATO mission in different historical moments. At the beginning, the allies talked in terms of “mutual aid” between the two sides of the Atlantic. After the Korean War and the birth of NATO, the problem became more pressing. However, during the whole Cold War the unbalance between European countries and the US remained unsolved, with the latter ensuring the security of Europe. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, NATO still tried to overcome the problem of the European strategic dependence from the US by also involving the newly born structures of the European Union. Anyway, the results have not been satisfactory and today the SMART DEFENCE initiative plus the Ukrainian crisis invite to reflect on the need to close the transatlantic gap of military budgets
Ferdinando Sanfelice di Monforte, La Politica Europea di Sicurezza e Difesa: dallo sviluppo delle capacità al POOLING AND SHARING
Abstract – The crisis in former Yugoslavia in 1991 was impossible to contain, due to the lack of capabilities by European States, whose forces were land-heavy, thus supplementary to those of the USA, whose commitments in the Persian Gulf prevented any timely initiative. A “power vacuum” was therefore detected in Europe, and this led to a number of initiatives within the EU, including the Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). Inevitably, in 1999 the newborn ESDP focused on capability development and established the European Defense Agency (EDA) to perform this task. Notwithstanding the limitations imposed by EU Member States (EU MSs), EDA has started several projects, but they proved not enough, especially with the deepening of the economic crisis; therefore, a new initiative, POOLING AND SHARING has been envisaged, to allow all EU MSs to develop in common the “critical capabilities” required, and to use them to the general benefit. Three major projects have been started: Air-to-air refueling, modular field hospitals, and cooperative pilot training; while others are being studied. The lack of cohesion among EU MSs and the limited technological level of Europe, though, hinder this initiative, to the point that POOLING AND SHARING will perforce rely on collaboration with NATO.
Abstract – SMART DEFENCE is a tool as well as a mindset to look into multinational approaches for generating defence capabilities. It is mostly about encouraging the Allies to nurture the culture of cooperation that has contributed to the NATO cohesion and interoperability and that in this time of economic constrains represents in many cases the only option to pursue capability development. In an increasingly dynamic and unpredictable security environment, the Alliance needs more flexible and agile forces, modern, deployable and sustainable, as defined by the NATO Forces 2020 objectives and the new NATO Defence Planning Process. In this framework, SMART DEFENCE became an effective mean for Nations to team up and develop, procure and maintain the capabilities the Alliance needs to address the essential core tasks defined in the NATO Strategic Concept. However, this effort needs to be accompanied by rebalancing the insufficient contribution of the European Members compared to the United States and a structured and effective coordination mechanism with the EU POOLING AND SHARING initiative
Gabriele Checchia, Le missioni militari italiane all’estero fattore di prestigio nazionale
Abstract – The admirable participation of Italian Armed Forces in many international missions has increased the international prestige of our country, as in the cases of UNIFIL in Lebanon, ISAF in Afghanistan and KFOR in Kosovo. Italy has also played a decisive role in the recent military operation in Libya, named Unified Protector, where she has efficiently defended her own interests. Italian soldiers are highly appreciated in operational theatres thanks to their high reliability and professionalism and their ability to interact with local people in respect of particular local contexts. Looking ahead, future missions will take place in a changing international environment from the perspectives of security and of geopolitics. In the developing context of the XXI century, therefore, NATO will continue to play a pivotal role in those missions abroad as the main international political-military organization and as a vital security hub.
Abstract – Italy is progressively decreasing funds for overseas military missions with the gradual withdrawal from the Afghan mission, which in recent years has absorbed at least fifty percent of those resources allocated for overseas missions. Beyond the costs, one should wonder if the current missions correspond to our national interests, to our priorities in the security field and to our sustainability criteria taken into account in the recent spending review that does not spare the military. According to our national interest and to our financial difficulties, therefore, the author argues that it would be important to withdraw the military currently deployed in Afghanistan, in Lebanon and in many other countries where they symbolically operate in small contingents under the flags of the European Union, NATO and the UN. The only commitments to maintain, as they have a direct impact on our national interests, are those in the Balkans, in Kosovo, and in the Indian Ocean, in the struggle against piracy.
Abstract – “Unpredictability” and “uncertainty” are two commonalities between the present security and financial scenarios, together with their increasing “complexity”. Indeed, it seems difficult to predict both the spread future trend and the evolution of the security threats. However, Libya taught us that modern operations have a start and an end, and that they may be decided, planned, conducted and completed in a short time. In addition, the Operation Unified Protector (OUP) proved the enduring and unique added value offered by NATO in terms of political consultation, Command and Control and capabilities. Since the very beginning, OUP revealed that even during limited operations, advanced and interoperable capabilities are essential. The growing divide between the two shores of the Atlantic in defense spending is putting at stake not only the interoperability in operations between the European Allies and the United States, but the Transatlantic link itself and the indivisibility of security.
Abstract – After more than twenty years from the German re-unification, the rise to the great power status of Germany induces fears in European public opinion, which sees in history a dangerous precedent. These concerns are fundamentally misplaced. Germany does not want to assume a hegemonic leadership in Europe. Berlin, on the contrary, hopes to be a civilian great power and rejects the accusations of imposing a German Europe. Her foreign policy is influenced by the intrinsic reluctance of national public opinion to assume hegemonic burdens on the European and world scenarios. Berlin is pursuing an active diplomatic presence by preferring peaceful forms of cooperation and humanitarian contributions, even when she participates in international military missions. On the one hand, hence, the problem of the German rise is that Berlin is not willing to take up its responsibilities in the security environment; on the other hand, Europe would be reluctant for historical reasons to accept the German leadership. However, the truth is that Europe cannot imagine itself without Germany and Germany cannot conceive herself without Europe.
Abstract – The impact on the commercial production of military technologies has been the subject of regular academic debates, especially after the Industrial Revolution of the 19th century. Scholars usually agree on two points. First, the security provided by Armed Forces is essential to push economic growth. Second, the costs of military procurement and, in particular, those in Research & Development have repercussions on commercial productions (spin-off ). After the end of the Cold War, the transfer usually occurs in the opposite direction, from civilians to military (spin-in). This spin-in raises different problems for the military, particularly because of the rapid pace of the evolution of civilian technologies. This often results as incompatible with the service life of either military platforms or the systems installed on them. The evolution of the configuration has therefore become a hallmark of modern armaments.
Abstract – The quest for non-military tools to solve political crisis is a recurring ambition of States and the international community, particularly in times of increasing prosperity or latent difficulty. In both contexts, it is implicit the idea that, firstly, the widespread use of non-military instruments is less politically divisive at the domestic level and, secondly, that these instruments can join greater consensus inside the international community. In analytical terms, a credible and shared evidence that the economic lever provides a real political effectiveness has not yet been provided. By contrast, after the end of the Cold War economic sanctions have been adopted in several crises, on the assumption that they could really be effective and efficient. What scholars must still identify, however, are some preliminary and clear-cut guidelines to assess the success (or the failure) of economic sanctions and their direct and indirect costs that have on those who decide to use them.
Abstract – The Italian Armed Forces undertook a deep transformation in the post-Cold War period. One of the main reasons of this process has been Italy’s participation to NATO crisis management operations, which had three important effects on Italian military. First, it forced a reality check of military capabilities and a bottom-up adaptation while operating. Second, it fuelled a change in the military doctrine and mindset towards an expeditionary posture, reflected in the Ministry of Defence’s main official documents. Third, it provided additional ad hoc funding to finance maintenance, training and operational costs of Armed Forces, which have been under-funded by Italian defence budget in the last decade. Nowadays, the main challenge for Italian military is to manage the ongoing transformation in order to maintain its effectiveness, in particular considering the decline of NATO military effort in Afghanistan.
Abstract – In the last decades the sub-national dimension identified with regions has established itself in government and public policies and entered into collective imagination in Europe. The paper draws on the multi-disciplinary literature focusing on the success of European regions and on the “metamorphosis” of the concept of region in the context of globalisation. In light of recent trends of regional policymaking in Europe, this paper examines how the crisis of the territoriality of politics has affected the significance and role of the regional level of government. Nowadays, the regional space ultimately lies in the articulation and aggregation of interests in the policy process more than in the formal division of competences and in the structure of political authority.
Abstract – The paper analyses the recent reforms of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) in the light of the sovereign debt crisis. In the last few years, the Euro area has created rescue mechanisms to avoid default of its Member States, has strengthened economic governance and has introduced a stronger European prudential supervision on the banking system. Several Member States have therefore adopted austerity measures to respect the new rules on fiscal integration under European coordination. The current process of transformation of the EMU presents, however, several contradictions, which could undermine the legitimacy and efficacy of the reforms. First, the development of stronger European economic governance is eroding core sovereignty of Member States, raising concerns from national Constitutional Courts. Second, the new economic governance is managed by intergovernmental bodies, which do not directly respond to the citizens in contradiction with the democratic principle. Lastly, the adoption of austerity measures under the new rules on fiscal integration has caused the violation of social and labour rights in many Member States.
Giorgio Cella, Dove va Kiev? L’eterno dilemma Est-Ovest
Abstract – The tug of war between the Euro-Atlantic bloc and the Russian Federation to co-opt Ukraine into their respective spheres of influence, has reached its peak of tension when in November 2013 the Ukrainian government scrapped the country’s European Union Association Agreement, and decided the consequent approach towards Moscow signing a sound economic and cooperation agreement, giving way to the Euromaidan protests in the following months culminating with February’s bloody clashes in Kiev that led to the removal from power of president Yanukovich and the release of former prime minister Yulia Timoshenko. The events in Kiev triggered Russian separatism in the strategic Crimea region as well, leading to an increased Russian military presence in this Black Sea peninsula. The stake for both regional players is indeed high, since the geopolitical position of Ukraine, with its 47 million inhabitants, is historically and strategically relevant as a buffer zone between Western Europe and Russia. It has also assumed additional momentum as a primary gateway to Europe for oil and natural gas coming from Russia. If from the European Union’s standpoint the integration of Kiev into its sphere of influence would boost the overall trust in the European project and strengthen its presence in Eastern Europe, in the Kremlin’s view it is a crucial imperative, both for the ancient cultural, religious and ethnic ties that bind the two countries since the time of the Kievan Rus’, and for practical geopolitical considerations as well, as for instance, the momentous Ukrainian presence in the future Russian-led Eurasian Union. The situation for the future of Ukraine divided between pro-European, pro-Russian, and nationalist tendencies remains strongly uncertain; caught between the possible destiny of a return into the Russian orbit, the potential risks of partitioning along the historical East-West lines of cleavage and a consequent balkanization of the country.
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Fede e Diplomazia
Le relazioni internazionali della Santa Sede nell’età contemporanea
Il volume affronta storicamente l’attività diplomatica della Santa Sede al servizio dell’opera della Chiesa cattolica per la diffusione e la difesa della fede nei diversi contesti nazionali a partire dall’epoca della Restaurazione, con vari saggi basati su puntuali e specifiche ricerche,
con ampia consultazione di fonti archivistiche della Santa Sede e di diversi Paesi. Il tema generale Le relazioni internazionali della Santa Sede può essere declinato sotto diversi aspetti: le caratteristiche peculiari della Diplomazia Pontificia, le relazioni bilaterali con gli Stati, la politica della Santa Sede nelle grandi questioni internazionali, i Concordati; in alcuni casi i problemi qui trattati sono drammatici, in
altri comunque significativi.