Abstract – Il testo della conferenza presenta un panorama completo delle relazioni tra Francia e Italia a partire dal 1861. La sorella latina d’oltralpe, che vanta di essere il più antico Stato-nazione d’Europa, ha sempre avuto un atteggiamento di condiscendenza verso il ben più recente stato unitario italiano, subito emancipatosi dalla interessata tutela francese. La grande Potenza riconosciuta guardava con una certa sufficienza la nuova venuta. Fino al 1940 si alternarono momenti di forte contrasto ad altri di intesa, seppur non di vera amicizia. Nel secondo dopoguerra, lo squilibrio rimase; nonostante la perdita di un ruolo chiave negli equilibri internazionali con il Generale de Gaulle la Francia ritrovò una sua grandeur proprio mentre l’Italia cadeva nel disordine e nell’instabilità politica e iniziava la vertiginosa crescita del debito pubblico. L’attrazione culturale sincera tra le due nazioni latine non è stata sempre sufficiente per infrangere stereotipi negativi. Negli ultimi 15 anni diverse questioni hanno diviso i due Paesi: Libia, immigrazione massiccia e illegale, la politica economico-finanziaria della Unione Europea, i rapporti economici bilaterali. I partiti tradizionali sono entrati in crisi in entrambi i Paesi, ma i nuovi soggetti politici dominanti emersi sono ben diversi.
Abstract – The Briand-Kellogg Pact was an instrument to find peace in the relations between the States. It was written after the tragic experience of the First World War. The Pact strengthened the League of Nations, but the League did not have the instruments to maintain the peace between nations. It was a declamatory diplomacy. The creation of the UN was another step for a more effective institution that could promote peace. Nevertheless, even after the Second World War the violence is still present in the international relations and even the atomic era did not stop the violence around the world. Even so there are some improvements in the international relations. The challenge launched by the Briand-Kellogg Pact is still alive and it is an important prospective for the future.
Abstract – The political stabilization of the Balkan region is compromised by lasting conflicts among the different populations: the local hostilities provoked by the decline of the Ottoman Empire during the whole XIX Century have set up some permanent divisions, which were even increased by the storms of the two world wars during the XX Century. The fall of the Berlin wall, in 1989, instead of improving the situation of south eastern Europe, opened the way to further local wars which destroyed the souls of all the involved nations in the former Yugoslavian countries and in Albania. In 2019 the situation is still very complicate and the expected integration of the Western Balkan countries in the European international organizations is constantly delayed because of lack of progress in the framework of the internal reforms and in the bilateral and multilateral relations. Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, North Macedonia, Montenegro and Albania are looking forward a more fruitful mutual regional cooperation, but each country has to resolve crucial issues with the neighbor countries and with internal secession movements. The international community, since several decades, is acting in a controversial way: pretending to offer a neutral and objective assistance to the concerned Balkan countries, the international community (and especially the western countries) has too often behaved with a double face approach, showing to be quite sensitive to the potential geopolitical and economic advantages that the Balkan region may offer to any powerful foreign diplomacy newly involved in the area.
Abstract – NATO played a clear role during the so-called Cold War. The potential enemy was clear and very close for the Western European countries. This adversary was known about military capabilities and what his goals would be if a conflict broke out. As a result, the Armed Forces of the signatories of the Atlantic Pact had been organized in order to oppose this threat, in particular by developing an apparatus of “deterrence” based not only on conventional forces, but also on a massive nuclear armament. The conclusion of the opposition with the Soviet Union led to a reconsideration of NATO’s role, but the worsening of the Bosnian crisis “revitalized” the alliance and determined its first “out of area” intervention. From that moment, that actually was the first NATO’s combat engagement, were revealed the strong differences in the operational abilities between Europeans and Americans, but also became clear the different approaches to interventions, that often will “divide” the allies. The “out of area” operations are characterized not only by combat activities, but also by stabilization and reconstruction activities. This context has determined a reorganization of NATO’s military structure, in order to face the new security challenges of its members. The deterrence factor is still central to NATO’s strategy, but considering the increasingly number of “out of area” missions, the present paper will analyze the evolution of NATO’s forces, that are seeking ever greater interoperability and expeditionary capabilities.
Abstract – In the months following the fall of the Soviet Union the West was filled with a sense of hope. Indeed, it seemed that the old enemy was ready to embrace Western liberal-democratic values and the free-market economy. Although this illusion has been cultivated in the West for a long time, the invasions of Georgia and Ukraine, and the hybrid and information warfare launched by Moscow against the Transatlantic area have clearly shown that the geopolitical and historical regularities still matter in the XXI century. Therefore, it appears vital to understand the reasons why the Western approach has failed, and which are the main dynamics underlining the relations between the West and Russia in the last thirty years. At the same time, dwelling on the victory of Donald Trump in 2016 and his tenure as President of the United States, particularly with regard to US-Russia relations, it is necessary to put the present time in the right perspective, avoiding drawing hasty, and wrong, conclusions on a presidency more traditional than often painted. The aim is to create a framework to understand the past and face the future with great awareness.
Abstract – The NATO’s Southern flank represents one of the Alliance’s side on which this latter plays its future role in the Euro-Atlantic space. Until the end of the Second World War, although the operations in the former Yugoslavia (with Allied Force), in Afghanistan (with ISAF, the International Security Assistance Force), and in Libya, the NATO’s attempt to redefine its own strategic targets, in particular in front of the 2010 Strategic Concept, has faced several challenges: firstly the war in Ukraine, and then the conflict in Syria, the hybrid warfare and the international terrorism. In front of these tests, Turkey seems at the center of a pendulum between United States and Russia, on a multidimensional contest. This paper regards with a deep analysis of the principal phases of the relationships between Turkey and NATO during the last decades, starting with its accession in 1952 and finishing with the most recent 2018. The paper analyzes Ankara’s role as a bridge for Middle East and as a door throughout the Europe, from one side, and the development in Turkish foreign policy, from the other. Moreover, the analysis is focused on the so-called Sèvres Syndrome suffered by Turkey, with its particular influence on its security and defense policies.
Abstract – This study intends to examine what many scholars have defined as the «crisis of the liberal democracy model» after the rise of populist movements. By analysing both its deficiencies and structural changes promoted by these political forces, this paper evaluates democratic theory – particularly, realist school and the case study of American democracy – to debunk the assumption that voters aspire to a populist democracy. To grasp whether populism represents a real threat for democracy, this study moots a pair of critiques coming from two different standpoints. The first issue concerns «receptivity», that is, the ability of populist movements to bound their own success to political system’s ineptitude to satisfy the needs of all the citizens. On the other hand, instead, many intellectuals and traditional political forces benefit at times the interpretative tools of «political ignorance» to clarify the main reasons behind the triumph of populism. Both problems seem to be entwined, but they are not enough to explain the crisis that appears to affect the political system. The great success of populism seems to be interrelated with the concept of «identity politics», by which is much easier interpreting electoral behaviour in a democratic system based on individual social identities. Shifting focus away from policies to the decision-making process, it is possible to find a greater receptivity within populist movements. The new political fractures between centre and periphery, religion and secularism, pro-Europeans and anti-Europeans, and the public struggle on issues regarding ethnicity and race reveal the strength of «identity politics». Liberal democracy seems now to be subjected to a consolidation depending upon critical change of the functioning of the current political scenario.